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A B S T R A C T  
 
To overcome gender bias and long-standing inequalities, more than 110 countries 
worldwide are reported to practice gender quotas in some form. Nonetheless, electoral quotas 
are not uncontroversial, despite their political appeal and common adoption. Critics note that 
such measures run a danger of bringing to office individuals who lack the necessary 
qualifications and who may then be easily manipulated. Supporters in comparison argue that 
empowering members of groups who have historically been disadvantaged can result in more 
inclusive processes of policy-making – drawing in those previously excluded and enhancing 
the universality of legislative perspectives. This can change the outcomes from political 
decision-making to the extent that it improves access to public goods by those who had earlier 
been excluded or marginalised. The majority of comparative literature on women’s 
representation has argued that more inclusive and diverse legislatures are fundamental for the 
democratic legitimacy of elected bodies, primarily because they provide a voice for 
historically underrepresented groups. Studies also suggest that female participation in 
legislative processes helped to overcome gender bias in access to specific services and that 
female legislators tended to allocate more funds to causes important to women. In light of 
these arguments, the question remains one to discuss and opine on: are specific gender quotas 
the adequate instrument to give women access to power in order to achieve the ultimate goal 
of gender equal participation in decision-making processes? Furthermore, this dissertation 
aims to answer the question whether electoral gender quotas have an impact on policy 
outcomes enhancing women’s life and on women’s representation in a broader sense. 
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C H A P T E R  O N E   I N T R O D U C T I O N  
 
1 . 1  I N T R O D U C T I O N  
In 2015, 193 Member States of the United Nations unanimously adopted a new 
global agenda to end poverty by 2030 and to pursue a sustainable future for all. The 
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development1 (SDGs) includes a specific goal to achieve 
gender equality, aiming to end discrimination and violence against women and girls, 
and to ensure equal participation and opportunities in all spheres of life. One of the 
targets for Goal 5 is to ‘ensure women’s full and effective participation and equal 
opportunities for leadership at all levels of decision-making in political, economic, and 
public life’ (SDG Target 5.5). 
 
However, the implementation reality looks dire. According to the data included in 
the ‘Women in Politics 2017 Map’2, launched by the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) 
and UN Women, SDG Target 5.5 still remains largely utopian, as the number of 
women in the executive of governments and in parliaments worldwide has mostly 
stagnated with only marginal improvements. Furthermore, only two out of the 193 
reviewed states have reached the promulgated 50 per cent threshold for women in their 
national parliament.3 The barriers that women face when trying to participate in 
decision-making bodies occur on four different levels: individual, institutional, 
structural, and socio-cultural.4 
 
To overcome gender bias and persistent inequalities, more than 110 countries 
worldwide are reported to apply gender quotas in some form. According to the 
Atlas of Electoral Gender Quotas, ‘gender quotas are numerical targets that stipulate 
the percentage of women that must be included in a candidate list or the number of 
 
1 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 70/1 ‘Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development’, U.N. Doc. A/RES/70/1, adopted on 25 September 2015 [SDGs]. 
2 The Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) ‘Women in Politics 2017 map’ (2017) United Nations Entity 
for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women), available: 
http://www.unwomen.org/en/digital-library/publications/2017/4/women-in-politics-2017-map, 
accessed 14 August 2018. 
3 Ibid.. 
4 J Ballington, A Karam ‘Women in Parliament – Beyond Numbers’ (2005) International Institute for 
Democracy and Electoral Assistance, available at: 
https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/women-in-parliame'nt-beyond-numbers-a-revised-
edition.pdf, accessed 14 August 2018, 31 [Women in Parliament – Beyond Numbers]. 
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seats to allocate to women in a legislative body.’5 Their overall aim is ‘to reverse 
discrimination in law and in practice and to level the playing field for women and men 
in politics.’6 This thesis focuses on electoral gender quotas in legislatures only. 
 
Despite their political appeal and common adoption, electoral quotas are not 
uncontroversial. Critics note that such measures run a danger of bringing to office 
individuals who lack the necessary qualifications and who may then be easily 
manipulated.7 Supporters, in comparison, argue that empowering members of groups 
who have historically been disadvantaged can result in more inclusive processes of 
policy-making – drawing in those previously excluded and enhancing the universality 
of legislative perspectives.8 This can change the outcomes of political decision-making 
to the extent that it improves access to public goods by those who had earlier been 
excluded or marginalized.9 
 
Furthermore, the majority of comparative literature on women’s representation 
has argued that more inclusive and diverse legislatures are fundamental for the 
democratic legitimacy of elected bodies, primarily because they provide a voice for 
historically underrepresented groups.10 Studies also suggest that female participation 
in legislative processes have helped to overcome gender bias in access to specific 
services and that female legislators tended to allocate more funds to causes that are 
important to women.11 In light of these arguments, the question remains one to discuss 
 
5 D Dahlerup, Hilal, Kalandadze, Kandawasvika-Nhundu Atlas of Electoral Gender Quotas (2013) 
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), available at: 
https://www.idea.int/publications/catalogue/atlas-electoral-gender-quotas?lang=en, accessed 9 July 
2018, p. 16. 
6 Ibid. 
7 ML Krook ‘Gender Quotas and Women’s Political Empowerment’ (2010), E-International Relation, 
available at: https://www.e-ir.info/2010/06/18/gender-quotas-and-women%E2%80%99s-political-
empowerment/, accessed 15 August 2018; Franceschet, Piscopo ‘Gender Quotas and Women’s 
Substantive Representation: Lessons from Argentina’ (2008), Politics and Gender, pp. 393-xx, 394, 
available at: 
http://web.pdx.edu/~mev/pdf/PS%20471%20Winter15%20Readings/Franceschet_Piscopo.pdf, 
accessed 15 August 2018. 
8 L Baldez ‘Elected Bodies: The Gender Quota Law for Legislative Candidates in Mexico (2004), 
LSQ, pp. 231-xx, 238. 
9 Miranda ‘Impact of women’s participation and leadership on outcomes’ (2005), available at: 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/egm/eql-men/docs/EP.7_rev.pdf, accessed 15 August 2018, p. 6. 
10 J Lovenduski ‘Feminizing Politics’ (2005) Polity Press, Cambridge; Mansbridge, 1999; Phillips, 
1995. 
11 P Paxton, M Hughes ‘Women, Politics and Power’ (2007); B Reingold, J Harrell ‘The Impact of 
Descriptive Representation on Women’s Political Engagement: Does Party Matter?’ (1992), PRQ, p 
286. 
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and opine on: are specific gender quotas an adequate instrument to give women access 
to power and to ensure gender equal participation in decision-making processes? 
 
Examining the existing national gender quota laws and policies therefore becomes 
relevant, as it may advance the discussion about the presumed necessity of affirmative 
action regarding the adoption of gender parity policies in decision-making bodies. It 
is in cross-national patterns that one can identify the efficiency and impact of specific 
legal designs or institutions of gender quotas. 
 
It can be argued that most men enjoy a democratic head start in terms of political 
participation since women’s right to vote in many countries is merely 100 years old.12 
This thesis’ socio-political relevance lies in a catalogue of answers to the question 
whether the male democratic head start can only effectively be outbalanced by gender 
quotas and/or other similar legal affirmative actions. 
 
1 . 2  T H E O R E T I C A L  B A C K G R O U N D  
In this thesis, ‘(electoral) gender quota’ or ‘quota’ refers to legislated gender 
quotas for legislative decision-making bodies, i.e. national parliaments. 
 
In accordance with CEDAW General Recommendation No. 28, the term gender 
refers to socially constructed identities, attributes and roles for women and men and 
society’s social and cultural meaning for biological differences. This results in 
hierarchical relationships between women and men and in the distribution of power 
and rights favouring men and disadvantaging women.13 
 
Currently, electoral gender quotas are said to be the most effective tool for a rapid 
increase of women’s representation in elected government offices. However, quotas 
are not designed and equipped to remove all structural, institutional, societal, and 
social barriers for women in politics and should therefore be complemented by other 
measures designed to level the political and societal playing field for women.14 
 
 
12 Germany and Poland in 1918, Austria and Netherlands in 1919, and the United States in 1920. 
13 CEDAW General Recommendation 28, para. 5. 
14 Supra note 5. 
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1 . 2 . 1  Q U O T A  T Y P E S ,  A I M S  A N D  O B J E C T I V E S  
There are three main types of gender quotas in politics, although one can find 
different variations and implementations of each. These three main types include 
legislated candidate quotas (1), legislated ‘reserved seats’ (2), and party quotas (also 
known as voluntary quotas) (3).15 They are either mandated through national 
constitutions and or by municipal electoral laws. 
 
Legislated candidate quotas regulate the gender balance of the candidate lists 
and are binding by law for all political parties participating in elections. Countries with 
legislated candidate quotas in which a strict alternation between female and male 
candidates at national and/or sub-national level is required include Bolivia, Costa Rica, 
Ecuador, and France.16 
 
Legislated ‘reserved seats’ regulate, the gender balance of elected bodies by 
reserving a definite number of seats or percentage of seats for women Members of 
Parliament. Countries that operate under the ‘reserved-seats’ system include Rwanda 
and Uganda. 
 
The party quotas, which are also known as voluntary party quotas, are adopted by 
individual political parties for their own list of candidates. They are usually stipulated 
in party statutes and rules. An example for party candidate quota is Sweden. Sweden 
has no legal requirement for quotas, but the Green Party, the Left Socialist Party, and 
the Social Democratic Party apply the so-called ‘zipper system’. According to this 
system, the parties nominate 50 per cent men and 50 per cent women on their lists for 
election, alternating between both sexes throughout the list.17 
 
Countries and territories with reserved seats in the lower or upper house of 
parliament or at sub-national levels include, among others, India, Pakistan, Kenya, 
Lesotho, Libya, Kosovo, Rwanda, and Uganda.18 Based on the Atlas of Electoral 
Quotas, 60 countries use legislated candidate quotas, 36 countries use the ‘reserved 
 
15 Ibid, at 23. 
16 Ibid. 
17 D Dahlerup, ‘Has Democracy Failed Women?’ (2018), Polity Press, Cambridge, p. 63. 
18 Supra note 15. 
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seats’ system and in 37 countries at least one political party represented in parliament 
uses a voluntary party quota.19 
 
The rapid rise of both voluntary and involuntary gender quotas, as a policy tool to 
achieve more representation of women in the public sphere, is underpinned by the 
conviction that true gender parity in representation, without any special or affirmative 
measures, would take several decades. 
 
Gender quotas are further considered to be ‘necessary affirmative action measures 
to realise de facto substantive equality for women.’20 They seek to ‘place the burden 
of recruitment not on the individual woman but on those who control the recruitment 
process.’21 Their aim is to reform the inherent institutional masculinity which 
characterises most legislatures. 
 
1 . 2 . 2  O B S T A C L E S  T O  W O M E N ’ S  P A R T I C I P A T I O N  I N  D E C I S I O N -
M A K I N G  B O D I E S  
Radical feminism suggests and theorises about the subordination of women 
through the lens of sex, gender, and sexuality. However, radical feminisms’ goal is not 
to merely effect changes to the law, but to achieve a complete change of the patriarchal 
systems that structure women’s lives.22 
 
Women who want to enter the world of politics find that the public, cultural, and 
social environment is often unfriendly or even hostile to them in their efforts to reach 
positions in legislative decision-making bodies. The obstacles that women face can be 
classified as political, socio-economic, ideological and psychological (or socio-
cultural).23 
 
 
19 Ibid at 17. 
20 See Article 4 (1) Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW), available at: http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/text/econvention.htm#article4, 
accessed 21 January 2019. 
21 D Dahlerup ‘Women, Quotas and Politics’ (2006). 
22 Bonthuys, Albertyn ‘Gender, Law and Justice’ (2007), Juta, pp. 34-35. 
23 N Shvedova, ‘Obstacles to Women’s Participation in Parliament’ in Ballington, Karam (eds.) 
Women in Parliament – Beyond Numbers (2005) International Institute for Democracy and Electoral 
Assistance, available at: https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/women-in-parliame'nt-
beyond-numbers-a-revised-edition.pdf, accessed 14 August 2018, pp. 33-50, 34. 
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Among the political obstacles that women face is the dominance of the ‘masculine 
model’ of political life and of elected offices, the lack of sustained contact and 
cooperation with public organisations, such as trade and labour unions which are 
mainly male-dominated, the lack of political network opportunities, and the limited 
financial support for women candidates24. The political obstacles above reflect the 
patriarchal structure of today’s governments and the public law-making sphere, where 
male dominance is the norm.25 
 
Socio-economic realities play a significant role in the recruitment of women for 
political roles.26 The social and economic status of women in society has a direct 
influence on their participation in policy-orientated institutions and decision-making 
elected offices. The most severe obstacles to women’s participation can be classified 
into two categories. The first is the limited access to education and choice of 
professions and the second is the dual burden of ‘domestic duties’ and professional 
obligations.27 
 
Socio-cultural barriers that women face when attempting to stand for office 
include cultural patterns and predetermined social roles assigned to women and men, 
which is exacerbated by the way women are portrayed in mass media, including those 
who already hold political office.28 
 
1 . 2 . 3  E Q U A L I T Y  
Since electoral gender quotas provide an instrument to achieve gender equality 
within decision-making legislative bodies it is important to differentiate and explain 
the term equality, moreover, formal (de jure) and substantive (de facto) equality. 
 
 
24 J Ballington, ‘Gender Equality in Political Party Funding’ (2003), International Institute for 
Democracy and Electoral Assistance, available at: 
https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/speeches/Gender-Equality-in-Political-Party-Funding.pdf, 
accessed 14 August 2018. 
25 See supra note 2. 
26 N Shvedova, ‘Obstacles to Women’s Participation in Parliament’ in Ballington, Karam (eds.) 
Women in Parliament – Beyond Numbers (2005) International Institute for Democracy and Electoral 
Assistance, available at: https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/women-in-parliame'nt-
beyond-numbers-a-revised-edition.pdf, accessed 14 August 2018, pp. 33-50, 42. 
27 Ibid, at 38 f. 
28 Ibid, at 41. 
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Equality encompasses that persons, regardless of their gender, race, ethnicity, and 
religion, should in principle be treated equally, if they can be considered to be in an 
equal situation. This can be referred to as formal equality, which implies having equal 
rights and being treated equally. In comparison to formal equality, substantive equality 
deals with the result of the treatment, which should be equal. Hence, the distinction 
between the two forms of equality is that formal equality concerns the nature of the 
treatment, while substantive equality deals with the result of a certain treatment.29  
 
An example of formal equality is the right to vote which was granted to women 
in most countries during the 20th century and was a right formerly only available to 
men. Oostland states that formal equality puts a strong emphasis on the primacy of the 
individual and does not take the social and economic background of particular groups 
in society into account.30 He illustrates this by the following example: officially 
granting girls access to education might still not lead to similar enrolment rates for 
girls as for boys, when parents cannot afford to send all their children to school.31 
Eriksson therefore criticises formal equality for assuming an ideal world, in which all 
human beings are on an equal terms.32 Or as Gallagher states, ‘formal equality fails to 
recognise the fact that equal treatment of persons in unequal situations will invariably 
operate to perpetuate, rather than to eradicate injustices.’33 In comparison to formal 
equality, the principle of substantive equality requires that ‘unequal factual patterns 
have to treated unequally in order to attain an equal result.’34 
 
In the context of this dissertation its focus will be on gender equality in the public 
sphere, specifically national legislative decision-making bodies. Women’s formal 
right to equality in the public sphere is recognised almost universally, although some 
States reserve certain areas of public service for men, like military posts, succession 
 
29 EW Vierdag, ‘The Concept of Non-Discrimination in International Law’, Martinus Nijhoff, The 
Hague (1973), p. 14. 
30 R Oostland, ‘The Principle of Equality’(2012),  in Westendorp (ed.), The Women’s Convention 
Turned 30, pp. 67-xx, 69. 
31 See e.g. UNESCO, ‘Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2007’, Strong Foundations: Early 
Childhood Care and Education, UNESCO, Paris (2007), Table 2.9, pp. 29-xx, 33. 
32 M Kirilova, Eriksson, ‘Reproductive Freedom: In the Context of International Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Law’, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague (2000), p. 30. 
33 A Gallagher, ‘Ending the Marginalization: Strategy for Incorporating Women into the United 
Nations System’ (1997), Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 19, p. 290. 
34 R Alexy, ‘Theorie der Grundrechte’ (1985), Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, p. 379; 
EW Vierdag, ‘The Concept of Non-Discrimination in International Law’ (1973), Martinus Nijoff, The 
Hague, p. 13. 
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to the thrones, titles of nobility, and religious positions. Therefore, formal equality 
continues to be an important step, but is still not sufficient. 
 
As underlined before, representation and participation of women in political and 
public life in practice remain far from equal. De facto equality is reached when women 
have substantive equality of opportunity – i.e. where men and women benefit from 
substantially the same starting positions to participate in public and political in the way 
the deem fit.35  
 
Transformative equality in the public and political fields implies a real 
transformation of all public and political institutions as well as society at large, so that 
gender relations in public and political life are no longer set in historically persistent 
male paradigms of power.36 
 
1 . 2 . 4  R E P R E S E N T A T I O N  
It is relevant who we are represented by, with an emphasis on the representative’s 
social background, Philipps argues. She calls this ‘the politics of presence’.37 This is 
where, according to Schwartz, gender quotas for legislative decision-making bodies 
‘touch upon a recognition of the importance of the representation of women in 
institutional decision-making bodies’.38 Schwartz and Dahlerup argue that scholars 
have distinguished at least four arguments for quotas and women’s equal 
representation in parliaments. Frist, the justice argument which points to the fact that 
women represent half of the population and hence should have the right to half of the 
seats. Second, it is highlighted that women’s different experience, whether biologically 
or socially constructed, would improve the nature of the public sphere. The third 
argument indicates that men cannot represent women as effectively, since they have 
partly conflicting interests. Finally, it is important for women to seek political roles 
thus representing important role models and encouraging other women to follow their 
steps.39  
 
35 Wittkopp ‘Article 7 CEDAW’ in Freeman, Chinkin and Rudolf (eds.), The UN Convention on the 
Elimination of All Form of Discrimination Against Women – A Commentary (2012), Article 7, p. 
199. 
36 Ibid, at 211. 
37 Phillips, ‘Politics of Presence’ (1995), p. 25 
38 H Schwartz, ‘Women’s Representation in the Rwandan Parliament’ (2004), p. 16. 
39 H Schwartz, p. 16; D Dahlerup, ‘Has Democracy Failed Women?’ (2018). 
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The representation of women can be divided into three categories which mutually 
reinforce each other, being symbolic, descriptive, and substantive representation. 
 
Symbolic representation considers how women’s presence affects their 
constituents, their perception, and opinions. Analysing gender quota’s symbolic 
representation is crucial to understand their broader impact on public attitudes and 
women’s political empowerment. The introduction of quotas may signal inclusion by 
legitimising women’s presence, thereby challenging traditional stereotypes regarding 
women’s role and the private-public-dichotomy, which has been impeding women’s 
participation in legislative decision-making bodies.40 
 
Descriptive representation refers to the proportions of women and other minorities 
present in elected political bodies, sometimes being characterised as ‘mirror’41 
representation. In debates surrounding the descriptive representation of women in 
legislative decision-making bodies, assumptions are made about the consequences of 
making parliaments more descriptively representative. One assumption is the 
association of the selection of less capable candidates with the aim to achieve 
descriptive representation.42 
 
According to Franceschet, descriptive representation of women has received the 
most attention in comparative academic work. Reason for this, she argues, are the 
‘relatively straightforward to compare percentages of women in legislatures across 
countries.’43 Those studies have mainly focused on the ‘how’ of women’s election into 
decision-making bodies. 
 
According to Franceschet and Piscopo, ‘gender quotas are explicit measures that 
target gender bias in the candidate selection process, with the goal of increasing 
women’s descriptive representation.’44 Defenders of gender quotas therefore assume 
a link between descriptive and substantive representation.45 It is on the basis of this 
 
40 S Franceschet, ML Krook, M Psicopo, ‘The Impact of Gender Quotas’ (2012), Oxford University 
Press, pp. 9-12. 
41 Ibid, at p. 27. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid. 
44 S Franceschet, JM Piscopo, ‘Gender Quotas and Women’s Substantive Representation – Lessons 
from Argentina’ (2008), Politics and Gender (4), pp. 393-425, 394. 
45 Ibid, at 395. 
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controversy that one has to explore if and how gender quotas mediate the relationship 
among women’s presence in political institutions where gender quotas have been 
incorporated, their likelihood to act for women, and their success. This chapter will 
discuss the possible link between descriptive and substantive representation and 
analyse if one can assume that more women (descriptive representation) results in a 
more substantive representation of women. 
 
According to Franceschet, women’s substantive representation occurs when 
women legislators undertake activity on behalf of some or many women. Those actions 
range from the introduction and the support and draft of bills and laws addressing 
women’s issues, to the establishment of connections between female constituents and 
civil society and to putting women’s issues or interests on the agenda within 
committees, parliamentary hearings, etc.46 
 
The research on women’s substantive representation asks whether women seek 
and are able to promote women’s issues once they are elected to political office. Here, 
a key concern is to determine whether more women ‘make a difference’. As Thomas 
argues, female legislators often do have distinct policy priorities than their male 
colleagues but at the same time those differences do not always translate into policy 
gains for women as a group.47 Those who are supportive of quotas for legislative 
decision-making bodies assume that ‘as the number of women approximates a critical 
mass, attention to women’s policy concern will grow’.48 
 
In order to analyse whether gender quotas have an impact on women’s 
representation one has to agree on how to measure any potential impact. 
Representative democracy states that representation entails acting in the interest of the 
represented in a manner positive to them. Inevitably this brings up the frequently 
debated issue of women’s interests.49 A question that arises is whether it is possible to 
 
46 Ibid, at 397.  
47 S Thomas, ‘The Impact of Women on State Legislative Policies’ (1991), Journal of Politics 53 (3), 
pp. 958-976. 
48 S Franceschet, ML Krook, JM Piscopo, ‘Conceptualising the Impact of Gender Quotas’ in S 
Franceschet, ML Krook, JM Piscopo (eds.) The Impact of Gender Quotas, New York: Oxford 
University Press, pp. 3-27, 8 referring to S Thomas, ‘How Women Legislate’ (1994), New York: 
Oxford University Press; S Childs, ML Krook, ‘Analysing Women’s Substantive Representation: 
From Critical Mass to Critical Actors’ (2009), Government and Opposition 44 (2), pp. 125-145. 
49 H Schwartz 
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analyse women’s interest as if there was a universal meaning of the notion which 
addresses all women.  
 
As most scholars have done previously, this dissertation takes Pitkin’s classic 
work on representation as a starting point. According to Pitkin and her seminal work, 
The Concept of Representation, descriptive representation refers to the basic 
attribution of the elected legislators and how well they mirror the social group to which 
they are related through their gender, race, ethnicity or class. On the other hand, 
substantive representation occurs when legislators seek and are able to promote the 
interests and priorities of their constituents, according to Pitkin.50 Nonetheless, it is 
essential to point out the flaws of the Pitkin’s work which distinguishes between 
legislators who are descriptively similar and hence ‘stand for’ their constituents, and 
those who substantively ‘act for’ constituents by promoting issues of concern to that 
group.51 As pointed out by Franceschet and Piscopo, the problem with ‘linking 
descriptive and substantive representative’ is flawed as is the assumption that 
descriptive similarity, that is, sharing ascriptive features, ‘leads automatically to 
substantive similarity, which is, sharing perspectives, interests, and issues.’52 They 
correctly observe that the assumption that female politicians are needed to represent 
women’s interests and issues presumes a ‘homogeneity among women that reinforces 
essentialist notions of an exogenously given, universally shared, fixed female identity’, 
which does not take women’s intersectionality into account.53  
 
In this dissertation the view regarding women as a group is that of women’s 
identities being multiple, constituted not only by gender but also by ethnicity, race, 
class, and sexual orientation, amongst others. Furthermore, as Young argues, women 
are able to share a female perspective irrespective of any essential female identity.54 
According to Schwartz, although not undisputed, most feminist scholars agree that it 
is possible to establish a set of interests that is shared by all women, and to maintain a 
common minimal definition of women’s interests.55 
 
50 H Pitkin, ‘The Concept of Representation’ (1967). 
51 S Franceschet, JM Piscopo, ‘Gender Quotas and Women’s Substantive Representation – Lessons 
from Argentina’ (2008), Politics and Gender (4), pp. 393-425, 396. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid. 
54 IM Young, ‘Democracy and Inclusion’ (2000), Oxford University Press. 
55 H Schwartz, p. 18. 
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This dissertation will utilise Wängnerud’s definition of women’s interests/issues, 
which has three components. Firstly, the recognition of women as a social category, 
second, the recognition of a power imbalance between men and women, and lastly, the 
commitment to implement a policy that increases the autonomy of female citizens.56 
 
The link between representation and substantive gender equality is easy to draw. 
Substantive gender equality requires that equality is interpreted according to the broad 
context of realities of women’s disadvantages and the impact of these circumstances 
in order to eliminate disadvantage in outcome or result. The concept of substantive 
equality has special relevance in addressing disadvantage based on sex and gender. De 
facto gender equality implies that the interests, needs and priorities of both women and 
men are taken into consideration, recognising the diversity of different groups of 
women and men. Therefore, policies and laws which aim to promote women’s right 
and eradicate any violations against them are one of many steps towards substantive 
gender equality. The advocacy of such rights in legislative decision-making bodies can 
be an indicator for a country’s shift towards the achievement of substantive gender 
equality. 
 
1 . 3  R E S E A R C H  Q U E S T I O N S  A N D  O B J E C T I V E S  
This dissertation’s focus will be on women’s representation in decision-making 
bodies under national quota laws and the influence of international human rights law 
on women’s representation in the political sphere. Within this focus, the research 
question is as follows: are gender quotas an adequate instrument to give women access 
to power in order to achieve the goal of substantive representation of women in 
decision-making bodies, resulting in substantive gender equality? 
The thesis’ second and third chapter highlight existing national and international 
standards and analyse whether they ensure gender-equitable access to elective offices 
and mandates. This analysis includes information on international legal instruments 
and policies, including the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)57, the Millennium 
 
56 K Celis, S Childs, J Kantola, ML Krook, ‘Constituting Women’s Interests through Representative 
Claims’ (2009), Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 
Toronto, Canada, available at: http://mlkrook.org/pdf/Celis_et_al_APSA_2009.pdf, accessed 25 
November 2018. 
57 SDGs. 
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Development Goals (MDGs)58, the Convention for the Elimination of all forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)59 and Beijing Declaration and Platform for 
Action60, as well as regional and national legislative approaches and measures. 
Furthermore, they outline the different approaches taken by national legislatures in 
introducing quota laws, such as hard and soft law gender quotas, reservations, and 
political party gender quotas, amongst others. 
 
Chapter three provides a critical analysis of national legal initiatives using a 
feminist point of view. This includes an analysis of existing national laws, their 
objectives, and their impact on female representation in national decision-making 
bodies. Countries under review include Rwanda, Uganda, and France, three countries 
that have incorporated electoral gender quotas into their municipal law. The selection 
of these countries is based on available data, which will assist in analysing the impact 
of the various laws and policies. 
 
1 . 4  C H A P T E R  O U T L I N E  
The thesis comprises four chapters. 
 
Chapter One provides an introduction to the study, its background and the research 
questions. 
 
Chapter Two identifies and analyses the international and regional legal human 
rights framework in the context of women’s representation in decision-making bodies 
and its potential influence on national laws. 
 
Chapter Three describes and examines national laws that encompass electoral 
gender quotas. The focus is on three countries, France, Uganda, and Rwanda. 
Furthermore, this chapter will critically evaluate the impact of national gender quota 
 
58 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 55/2 ‘United Nations Millennium Declaration’, U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/55/2, adopted on 18 September 2000 [MDGs]. 
59 United Nations General Assembly, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women, 18 December 1979, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1249, p. 13 available at: 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/, accessed 14 August 2018 [CEDAW]. 
60 United Nations, Beijing Declaration and Platform of Action, adopted at the Fourth World 
Conference on Women, 27 October 1995, available at: 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/beijing/platform/declar.htm, accessed 14 August 2018 [Beijing 
Declaration]. 
 14 
laws on female representation and on policy outcomes. The analysis is based on the 
three aforementioned country case studies, taking into account their national laws.  
 
Lastly, Chapter Four aims to answer the research question and provide 
recommendations on how to achieve substantive gender equality and substantive 
representation of women through the use of electoral gender quotas. 
 
1 . 5  M E T H O D O L O G Y  
This dissertation analyses literature from secondary resources, including journals, 
reviews, books, and media articles. International and national human rights 
frameworks, as well as data on women in national and local decision-making bodies 
used as benchmarks to interpret and evaluate existing systems. Additionally, other 
relevant databases and online sources are utilised. 
 
1 . 6  C O N C L U S I O N  
Despite the removal of legal barriers to women’s political participation in many 
countries, governments remain largely male-dominated.61 Shvedova assumes that, 
‘excluding women from positions of power and from elected bodies impoverishes the 
development of democratic principles in public life and inhibits the economic 
development of a society.’62 Men, who dominate the majority of governing institutions 
nationally and internationally, do not necessarily support women’s political 
participation. The perennial question is whether quotas are an adequate instrument to 
increase women’s political participation on a large scale, and whether they yield a 
long-term outcome in influencing policy outcomes that are in the interest of women, 
representing women in a substantive manner.
 
61 See supra note 2. 
62 N Shvedova, ‘Obstacles to Women’s Participation in Parliament’ in Ballington, Karam (eds.) 
Women in Parliament – Beyond Numbers (2005) International Institute for Democracy and Electoral 
Assistance, available at: https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/women-in-parliame'nt-
beyond-numbers-a-revised-edition.pdf, accessed 14 August 2018, pp. 33-50, 34. 
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C H A P T E R  T W O  I N T E R N A T I O N A L  A N D  R E G I O N A L  
L E G A L  A N D  P O L I C Y  F R A M E W O R K  
 
2 . 1  I N T R O D U C T I O N  
According to the Atlas of Electoral Gender Quotas, ‘the framework for the use of 
quotas can be based on a wide range of international and national commitments and 
principles pertaining to the equality of rights and opportunities for women and men to 
participate in and be elected to legislative decision-making structures.’63 These include 
internationally binding conventions such as the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights and the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women, regionally adopted human rights treaties like the 
American Convention of Human Rights (1969), the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (1981) and its Protocol on Women (2003), the African Charter on 
Democracy, Elections and Governance (2007), the European Convention on Human 
Rights (1950), as well as various policy documents adopted at the international, regional, 
and sub-regional level. These include, amongst others, the Beijing Declaration and 
Platform for Action, adopted at the United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women 
in Beijing in 1995, which served to galvanize international and national actions in this 
regard, calling on governments to implement special measures (including the use of 
affirmative action) for the equal participation of women and men in decision-making ‘in 
order to strengthen democracy and promote its proper functioning’ and the Millennium 
Development and Sustainable Development Goals.64 
 
This chapter will outline the existing international and regional legal frameworks 
regarding the equality of men and women in the public and political field – from which 
one can draw preliminary conclusions to the legitimacy and the necessity of electoral 
gender quotas. The focus will be on the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination (CEDAW), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR), the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action and the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) and Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Each of these 
 
63 IDEA ‘Atlas of Electoral Gender Quotas’, p. 17, available at: 
https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/atlas-of-electoral-gender-quotas.pdf, accessed 8 
August 2018. 
64 Ibid. 
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legal international frameworks, in one way or another, contributes to the debate of 
electoral gender quotas. Under international law, adoption by the General Assembly of a 
Declaration, such as the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action or the Development 
Goals, have different consequences from treaties, such as the ICCPR and CEDAW, that 
came into force through a required number of ratifications. A declaration’s subject matter 
may be of great significance when approved or adopted, but it is hortatory and 
aspirational, i.e. recommendatory rather than, in a formal sense, binding. Therefore, this 
chapter’s focus will be on two binding treaties, the ICCPR and CEDAW, where the basic 
principle of international law, pacta sunt servanda, comes into effect. Within this focus, 
the emphasis will be on CEDAW and its Committee’s interpretations, as it is the most 
detailed, recent and ground-breaking international framework regarding women’s rights 
and providing the framework for realising equality between women and men. 
 
2 . 2  I N T E R N A T I O N A L  L E G A L  F R A M E W O R K  
 
2 . 2 . 1  I N T E R N A T I O N A L  C O V E N A N T  O N  C I V I L  A N D  P O L I T I C A L  
R I G H T S  
The participation of women in political decision-making positions was officially 
recognised as a political right with the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR) in 1948. UDHR Articles 2 and 21 stipulate equal enjoyment of political 
rights without discrimination on the basis of one’s sex or any other ground. The 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights reaffirmed the UDHR principle of 
the right to participate in public and political life without any discrimination in 1966.65 
 
The ICCPR contains classical human rights of the so-called ‘first generation’, which 
made their way into the domestic constitutional law of most State parties.66 
 
2 . 2 . 1 . 1  H I S T O R Y ,  S T R U C T U R E ,  M E C H A N I S M S  
In transforming the UDHR’s provisions into legally binding obligations, the United 
Nations adopted two separate International Covenants, which, taken together, constitute 
the bedrock of the international normative regime for human rights. The two separate 
 
65 Wittkopp ‘Article 7 CEDAW’ in Freeman, Chinkin and Rudolf (eds.), The UN Convention on the 
Elimination of All Form of Discrimination Against Women – A Commentary (2012), pp. 198-219, 216. 
66 Nowak ‘UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights CCPR Commentary’ (2005), Introduction, para 3. 
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treaties, which were adopted in 1966 after approximately 20 years of negotiation, are the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).67 The ICESCR, the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the ICCPR with its two Optional Protocols, 
are collectively known as the International Bill of Rights.68  
 
Although the official position, dating back to the Universal Declaration, is that the 
two covenants and sets of rights are ‘universal, indivisible and interdependent and 
interrelated’, there has been a deep and enduring disagreement over the proper status of 
civil and political rights on the one side and economic and social rights on the other side. 
One side argues that economic and social rights should be superior to civil and political 
rights, asking ‘of what use the right to free speech is to those who are starving and 
illiterate.’69 At the other extreme there is the view that economic and social rights do not 
constitute rights at all.70 This discrepancy was manifested in the drafting and ratification 
of two separate treaties, the ICCPR and the ICESCR. Despite the political and ideological 
pressure for separating human rights into two categories through regulating them with 
two different instruments, the preamble of the ICCPR and the ICESCR highlight the 
natural interdependence that exists between all human rights.71 As Alston states correctly, 
‘the interdependence principle, apart from its use as a political compromise between 
advocates of one or two covenants, reflects the fact that the two sets of rights can neither 
logically nor practically be separated in watertight compartments’72. Recently though, 
various scholars and practitioners have called for a united Covenant again, addressing the 
two covenants as a false dichotomy and calling the division artificial.73 Although 
believing in the interdependence and the indivisibility of the sets of rights, this 
 
67 World Health Organization (Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean), ‘Health and Human 
Rights – International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’ (2015), available at: 
http://www.who.int/hhr/Civil_political_rights.pdf, accessed: 1 September 2018. 
68 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Fact Sheet No. 2 (Rev.1), The 
International Bill of Human Rights’ (1996), available at: 
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FactSheet2Rev.1en.pdf, accessed: 1 September 2018. 
69 HJ Steiner, P Alston, R Goodman, ‘International Human Rights in Context’ (2007), Oxford University 
Press, p. 263. 
70 Ibid. 
71 F Gómez Isa, K de Feyter, ‘International Protection of Human Rights: Achievements and Challenges’, 
p. 158. 
72 HJ Steiner, P Alston, R Goodman‘Human Rights in Context’, Clarendon Press, Oxford, p. 247. 
73 See Hasan Shire, executive director of East and Horn Africa Network of Human Rights Defenders and 
Catarina de Alburquerque, former Special Rapporteur on Water and  Sanitation at a panel discussion on 
the 50th Anniversary of the Human Rights Covenants, 2016; available at: 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/TwoCovenantsShouldBeOne.aspx, accessed: 3 October 
2018. 
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dissertation’s focus will be on provisions regarding civil and political rights, therefore 
provisions of the ICCPR. Historically, civil and political rights have been seen as 
superior. From the lack of justiciability of social and economic rights, one can assume 
that this view is still dominant. 
 
The ICCPR was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 
16 December 1966 and entered into force on 23 March 1976. As of August 2018, the 
ICCPR has 74 signatories and 172 State parties.74 
 
The values and principles of the ICCPR are found in Article 2 and 3, and are based 
on the notion of non-discrimination. Article 2 ensures that rights recognised in the ICCPR 
will be respected and available to everyone within the territory of State parties. Article 3 
confirms the equal right of both men and women to the enjoyment of all civil and political 
rights set out in the ICCPR. 
 
Apart from the provisions in the ICCPR itself, there are two Optional Protocols to 
the Covenant which give additional protection. The First Optional Protocol allows 
victims of human rights violations to be heard. The Human Rights Committee (HRC) has 
the jurisdiction to receive, consider and hear communications from victims. The Second 
Optional Protocol to the ICCPR was adopted in 198975 and has one signatory and 86 State 
parties to it. It demands, amongst other things, the abolishment of the death penalty. 
 
Regarding the ICCPR’s enforcement mechanisms, Article 2 (2) provides that State 
Parties are to take the ‘necessary steps … to adopt such laws or other measures as may 
be necessary to give effect to the rights recognised in the present Covenant.’ State parties 
to the ICCPR must therefore take steps in their municipal jurisdiction to recognise the 
acceptance of the Covenant’s provisions. In addition to State parties’ formal legal 
adoption of the ICCPR into their municipal law, Article 28 provides for the Human Rights 
Committee (HRC) to be established for monitoring the implementation of the Covenant. 
 
 
74 United Nations Treaty Collection, Status as at: 31.08.2018, 07:32:44 EDT, available at: 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter=4&clang=_en, 
accessed: 1 September 2018. 
75 See UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/44/128 adopted by the General Assembly on 15 
December 1989. 
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The HRC examines State parties’ reports, submitted under Article 40, on the 
measures they have adopted to give effect to the rights recognised in the Covenant and 
on the progress made in the enjoyment of those rights. Having examined a State party’s 
report, the HRC issues what are known as Concluding Observations specifying positive 
and negative aspects of the State party’s implementation of the ICCPR and any remedial 
action the Committee recommends. The HRC further issues General Comments where a 
specific article or general issue in the ICCPR is analysed in an extensive manner. The aim 
of such general comment is to clarify the scope and meaning of the provisions of the 
Covenant.  
 
2 . 2 . 1 . 2  A R T I C L E  2 5  I C C P R  A N D  G E N E R A L  C O M M E N T  N O .  2 5  
Article 25 of the ICCPR states that every citizen shall have the right and the 
opportunity to take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through chosen 
representatives (a), to vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections (b), and to have 
access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his or her country (c). 
 
The Human Rights Committee has interpreted ‘the conduct of public affairs’ in 
Article 25 (a) as a ‘broad concept which relates to the exercise of political power, in 
particular the exercise of legislative, executive and administrative powers.’76 According 
to Manfred Nowak, the right and opportunity of citizens to take part in the conduct of 
public affairs formulates a duty for State parties to guarantee, with positive measures, that 
all formally eligible persons have the actual opportunity to exercise their political rights.77 
However, he connects this positive duty to ensure the right to vote, and not the right to be 
elected.  
 
According to the HRC, affirmative actions in order to achieve de facto equality more 
promptly for traditionally disadvantaged groups of the population, such as women or 
members of ethnic minorities, or for long suppressed political parties, does not qualify as 
discrimination within the meaning of Article 2, so long as measures are reasonable and 
temporary. For this reason, Australia withdrew reservation to Article 25 in 1984 and in 
the Stalla Costa case the Committee determined that Uruguay hat not violated Article 25 
 
76 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 25, paras. 12, 26 and 27. 
77 M Nowak, ‘U.N. Convention on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary’ (N.P. Engel, Kehl, 
2005), Art. 25, para. 9. 
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(c). In Concluding Comments on India, the HRC also expressly approved of a 
constitutional amendment prescribing that women receive at least one third of positions 
on elected local bodies, as well as the reservation of elected positions ‘for members of 
scheduled casts and tribes.’78 These quotas are measures of positive discrimination 
designed to ensure political representation for disadvantaged groups. Reasonable 
measures of positive discrimination are therefore compatible with Article 24 in the 
context of the right to stand for election and are furthermore harmonious with the specific 
non-discrimination provisions of the Covenant.79 
 
General Comment No. 25 related to the right to participate in public affairs, voting 
rights and the right of equal access to public service enshrined in Article 25 of the ICCPR. 
It was adopted by the Committee in its fifty-seventh session in July 1996. In paragraph 
24 of the General Comment it is states that State reports should describe the conditions 
to access to public service positions, any restrictions which apply and the processes for 
appointment. Reports should further indicate how the requirement for equal access is met, 
and whether affirmative measures have been introduced and, if so, to what extent.80 
Notably, the Comment does not refer to affirmative actions or other measures to enhance 
women’s participation. 
 
2 . 2 . 2  C O N V E N T I O N  O N  T H E  E L I M I N A T I O N  O F  A L L  F O R M S  O F  
D I S C R I M I N A T I O N  A G A I N S T  W O M E N  ( C E D A W )  
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
marked a milestone as the first legally binding international instrument for the protection 
of women’s rights.81 As of August 2018, 185 states have ratified the Convention. Not only 
has CEDAW increased attention to gender issues within the UN human rights framework, 
it has sparked transnational activism that uses the Convention to impact national policy 
 
78 UN doc. CCPR/C/79/Add. 81 (1998), para. 11. 
79 Joseph, Schultz, Castan, ‘The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Cases, Materials, 
and Commentary (2000), Oxford University Press, 509. 
80 See General Recommendation No. 25, para. 24, available at: 
http://www.equalrightstrust.org/ertdocumentbank/general%20comment%2025.pdf, accessed 3 October 
2018. 
81 Between 1949 and 1959, the Commission also elaborated the Convention on the Political Rights of 
Women, adopted by the General Assembly on 20 December 1952, the Convention on the Nationality of 
Married Women, adopted by the Assembly on 29 January 1957, the Convention on Consent to Marriage, 
Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriages adopted on 7 November 1962, and the 
Recommendation on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriages 
adopted on 1 November 1965. 
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developments.82 In 1999 the General Assembly adopted a 21-article Optional Protocol to 
CEDAW. By ratifying the Optional Protocol, the State party recognises the competence 
of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against women – CEDAW’s 
monitoring body – to receive and consider complaints from individuals or groups within 
its jurisdiction.83 It entered into force in December 2000 and has, as of August 2018, 80 
signatories and 109 State parties.84 
 
Before outlining the relevant provisions of CEDAW, i.e. Articles 2, 4, and 7, and the 
treaty body’s interpretations, for the purposes of this dissertation’s research focus, the 
paragraph below provides a brief overview and background to the Convention’s history, 
structure and its mechanisms. 
 
2 . 2 . 2 . 1  H I S T O R Y ,  S T R U C T U R E  A N D  M E C H A N I S M S  
As the Preamble of the Charter of the United Nation reaffirms ‘the faith in 
fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal 
rights of men and women’, equality of rights for women is one of the basic principles of 
the United Nations.85 The Charter was the first international instrument to refer 
specifically to human rights and to the equal rights of women and men. The International 
Bill of Human Rights extended and strengthened the emphasis on women’s rights.  
 
In order to guarantee women the set of rights laid down in the International Bill of 
Human Rights and other related human rights treaties, the Commission on the Status of 
Women (CSW) was founded in 1946. The CSW has sought to define and elaborate the 
general guarantees of non-discrimination in the various human rights instruments from a 
gender perspective.86 Between 1949 and 1959, the Commission produced the Convention 
 
82 S Zwingel, ‘From intergovernmental negotiations to (sub)national change’ (2006), International 
Feminist Politics Vol. 7 Issue 3, 400-424. 
83 UN Women, ‘Optional Protocol on the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women’, available at: http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/protocol/, accessed 8 August 
2018. 
84 United Nations Treaty Collection, available at: 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-8-b&chapter=4&lang=en, 
accessed: 3 October 2018. 
85 United Nations Charter, Preamble. 
86 United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (Un Women), ‘Short 
History of CEDAW Convention’ (2009), available at: 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/history.htm, accessed 1 September 2018. 
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on the Political Rights of Women87 as well as the Convention on Consent to Marriage, 
Minimum Age of Marriage and Registration of Marriages88. After the adoption of the 
Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (DEDAW) in 1967, 
which amounted only to a statement of moral and political intent, the CSW decided in 
1974 to prepare a single, comprehensive and internationally binding instrument to 
eliminate discrimination against women.89  
 
The text of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women was prepared by working groups within the Commission during 1976. 
The Convention was adopted by the General Assembly in 1979 and entered into force in 
September 1981, after the twentieth member State had ratified it. 
 
It consists of a Preamble and 30 articles that define what constitutes discrimination 
against women and is often described as an international bill of rights for women. 
Countries that have ratified or acceded to the Convention are legally bound to put its 
provisions into practice. They are also committed to submit national reports, at least every 
four years, on measures they have taken to comply with their treaty obligations.90 
 
The Committee that, according to Article 17 of CEDAW, oversees the Convention 
is the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women. It is a (U.N.) 
treaty body which, throughout its years of operation, has held multiple sessions to ensure 
the rights and rules outlined in CEDAW are being respected, implemented and not 
violated by the state parties. 
 
The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women is the body of 
independent experts that monitors the implementation of the Convention. It consists of 
23 experts on women’s rights from all around the world. Countries that have become 
party to the treaties are obliged to submit regular reports to the Committee to track the 
 
87 UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/7/640, adopted by the General Assembly on 20 December 
1952. 
88 UN General Assembly Resolution 1763 A (XVII), adopted by the General Assembly on 7 November 
1962. 
89 UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/22/2263, adopted by the General Assembly on 7 November 
1967. 
90 United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women), ‘Overview 
of the Convention’ (2009), available at: http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/, accessed: 1 
September 2018. 
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implementation status of the Convention. During its sessions the Committee considers 
each State party report and addresses its concerns and recommendations to the State party 
in the form of concluding observations.91 
 
In terms of the Optional Protocol to the Convention, the Committee is mandated to: 
(1) receive communications from individuals or groups of individuals submitting claims 
of violations of rights protected under the Convention to the Committee and (2) initiate 
inquiries into situations of grave or systematic violations of women’s rights. These 
procedures are solely applicable where the State concerned has ratified the Optional 
Protocol. The Committee further drafts general recommendations and suggestions, as 
Article 21 CEDAW invites it to do, based on the examination of State reports and 
information that has been received from the State parties. Between 1986 and 2018, the 
Committee has adopted 37 General Recommendations.92  
 
For the purpose of this dissertation’s research focus, General Recommendations 
No. 23, 25, and 28 and the corresponding CEDAW Articles’ provisions will be outlined. 
 
2 . 2 . 2 . 2  A R T I C L E  2  A N D  G E N E R A L  R E C O M M E N D A T I O N  N O .  2 8  
Article 2 of CEDAW focuses on what State parties have to do to in order to eliminate 
discrimination against women. It is both a general and a concrete provision.93 Article 2 
has been further described by the Committee as ‘the very essence of the Convention’ and 
as ‘crucial to its full implementation’.94 Together with Articles 1, 3, 4, 5 (a), and 24, 
Article 2 sets out the general obligations assumed by State parties. The provision focuses 
on law and the role of legislation and legal institutions in ensuring that women are not 
subject to discrimination, whether in law or in practice. 95 Article 2 provides ways for 
State parties to implement the provisions of the Convention into their municipal law.96 It 
is further set out that State parties ‘agree to pursue by all appropriate means and without 
 
91 United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (Un Women), ‘Short 
History of CEDAW Convention’ (2009), available at: 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/history.htm, accessed 1 September 2018. 
92 All Recommendations may be found at: 
https://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/cedaw/pages/recommendations.aspx, accessed: 28 August 2018. 
93 R Oostland, ‘Chapter 4: The Principle of Equality’ in Westendorp (ed.), The Women’s Convention 
Turned 30 (2012), pp. 67-95, 67. 
94 CEDAW General Recommendation 28, paras. 41 and 6. 
95 A Byrnes ‘Article 2 CEDAW’ in Freeman, Chinkin and Rudolf (eds.), The UN Convention on the 
Elimination of All Form of Discrimination Against Women – A Commentary (2012), Article 2, 72. 
96 CEDAW General Recommendation 28, para. 1. 
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delay policy of eliminating discrimination against women’. This general obligation 
contains important elements that the Committee explicated in its General 
Recommendation No. 28. According to this, a State party must: 
 
‘immediately asses the de jure and de facto situation of women and take concrete steps 
to formulate and implement a policy that is targeted as clearly as possible towards the 
goal of fully eliminating all forms of discrimination against women and achieving 
women’s substantive equality with men. The emphasis is on forward movement, from the 
evaluation of the situation to the formulation and initial adoption of a comprehensive 
range of measures to building on those measures continuously, in the light of their 
effectiveness ad new or emerging issues, towards the Convention’s goals.’97 
 
According to the Committee and its General Recommendation, ‘Article 2 is crucial 
to the full implementation of the Convention, since it identifies the nature of the general 
legal obligation of State parties.’98 
 
2 . 2 . 2 . 3  A R T I C L E  4  A N D  G E N E R A L  R E C O M M E N D A T I O N  N O .  2 5  
Article 4, in both its paragraphs, introduces the concept of special measures. In the 
first paragraph, it refers to temporary special measures (TSMs) to accelerate de facto 
equality for women. The second paragraph makes clear that special measures contained 
in the Convention, specifically those that aim to protect maternity, ‘shall not be 
considered discriminatory.’99 This section will mainly focus on the first paragraph, the 
temporary special measures to accelerate de facto equality for women. 
 
Not all measures directed to improving the situation of women are TSMs. The 
Committee has drawn attention to this distinction: 
 
‘State Parties should clearly distinguish between temporary special measures taken 
under article 4, paragraph 1, to accelerate the achievement of a concrete goal for women 
 
97 CEDAW General Recommendation 28, para. 24. 
98 Ibid, at para. 6. 
99 Schöpp-Schilling, ‘Reflections on a General Recommendation on Article 4 (1) of the Convention on 
the Elimination of All Form of Discrimination Against Women’ in Boereijn, Coomans, Goldschmidt, 
Holtmaat and Wolleswinkel (eds.), Temporary Special Measures: Accelerating de facto Equality of 
Women under Article 4 (1) UN Convention on the Elimination of All Form of Discrimination against 
Women (2003), p. 18. 
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of de facto or substantive equality, and other general social policies adopted to improve 
the situation of women and the girl child. Not all measures that potentially are, or will 
be, favourable to women are temporary special measures. The provision of general 
conditions in order to guarantee the civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights 
of women and the girl child, designed to ensure for them a life of dignity and non-
discrimination, cannot be called temporary measures.’100 
 
Raday interprets Article 4 (1) as a closing-gap-tool.101 The gap being the one between 
the right to equality and its translation into living law and social practice. She further 
states that Article 4 (1) provides for TSMs as promotional measures to ensure women 
equal opportunities in all fields of life. It is said to add an additional conceptual tool to 
the definition and the guarantees of de facto equality (that are already provided in Articles 
1, 2, 3, and 5 of the Convention). By doing so, Raday states, ‘the Convention recognises 
the intransigence and persistence of cultural and institutional barriers to women’s equality 
and the urgency of eliminating them.’102 
 
General Recommendation 25, which was adopted in 2004, provides an insight into 
CEDAW’s understanding of the concept of discrimination against women in Article 4 (1) 
of the Convention. The Committee explains that the concept of discrimination used in the 
Convention goes beyond the prohibition of discrimination based on sex and is further 
concerned with the discrimination of women because they are women. According to the 
Committee this entails, inter alia, that State parties should focus on the elimination of 
both direct and indirect discrimination, both in law and practice.103  
 
According to the General Recommendation and the Committee’s expressed view that 
systematic discrimination requires a systematic solution, it further states: 
 
‘A purely formal legal or programmatic approach is not sufficient to achieve women’s de 
facto equality with men, which the Committee interprets as substantive equality. In 
 
100 CEDAW General Recommendation 25, para. 9. 
101 F Raday ‘Article 4 in Freeman, Chinkin and Rudolf (eds.), The UN Convention on the Elimination of 
All Form of Discrimination Against Women – A Commentary (2012), Article 4. 
102 F Raday ‘Article 4 in Freeman, Chinkin and Rudolf (eds.), The UN Convention on the Elimination of 
All Form of Discrimination Against Women – A Commentary (2012), Article 4, pp. 124-137, 124. 
103 Westendorp, Waltermann, ‘Chapter 3: The Essence of Discrimination Against Women: An 
Interpretation by CEDAW and the European Union’ in Westendorp (ed.), The Women’s Convention 
Turned 30 (2012), pp. 33-66, 46. 
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addition, the Convention requires that women be given an equal start and that they be 
empowered by an enabling environment to achieve equality of results.’104 
 
The term ‘special measures’ may be functionally analogous to measures taken by 
States parties which have been variously described as affirmative action, positive action, 
positive measures, or preferential treatment. However, special measures under 
Article 4 (1) should be regarded as having an autonomous meaning i.e. that the provision 
affects the Convention in its entirety and not only special provisions, such as the one in 
Article 7. It was developed in accordance with the context and principles of the 
Convention. As a matter of fact, the Committee explicitly avoids the use of terms other 
than TSMs. 
 
2 . 2 . 2 . 4  A R T I C L E  7  A N D  G E N E R A L  R E C O M M E N D A T I O N  N O .  2 3  
Article 7 addresses State parties’ obligations in realising women’s political rights. 
These include the right to participate directly in the formulation of public policy as elected 
representatives (Article 7 (a)) or as appointed public officials (Article 7 (b)), as well as 
indirectly through voting (Article 7 (a)). Taking these provisions into account, State 
parties must aim to realise formal, substantive, and transformative equality which 
encompasses the adoption of temporary special measures under Article 4 (1) to accelerate 
its realisation. The Committee has elaborated upon the meaning and scope of Article 7 in 
its official analysis issued in 1994105 and through adopting General Recommendation No. 
23 in 1997.106  
 
The most detailed explanation of the scope of women’s political and public 
participation rights is provided in General Comment No. 23 of the Committee on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, which interprets Article 7 
of the Convention. 
 
 
104 CEDAW General Recommendation 25, para. 8. 
105 CEDAW Committee ‘Implementation of Article 21 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination Against Women. Analysis of Article 7 and 8 of the Convention. Report by the 
Secretariat (30 November 1993)’ UN Doc CEDAW/C/1994/4. 
106 CEDAW General Recommendation 23; Wittkopp ‘Article 7 CEDAW’ in Freeman, Chinkin and 
Rudolf (eds.), The UN Convention on the Elimination of All Form of Discrimination Against Women – A 
Commentary (2012), pp. 198-219, 198. 
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Article 7 of the Convention states that women’s rights to equal participation in 
political and public life encompasses the right to vote in all elections and public referenda 
and to be eligible for election to all publicly elected bodies; to participate in the 
formulation and implementation of government policy; to hold public office and to 
perform public functions at all levels of government. 
 
In its General Comment, the Committee notes the slow progress in achieving gender 
equality and identifies a number of barriers to the equal political participation of women 
stating that societies in which women are excluded from public life and decision-making 
cannot be described as democratic.107 
 
In comparison to other human rights conventions108, the wording of CEDAW makes 
it clear that equality before the law is not sufficient. Women’s rights, including women’s 
political rights, have to be ensured, meaning that women are able to enjoy these rights in 
practice and not only on paper. Some authors have argued that the wording ‘on equal 
terms with men’ confirms that Article 7 is asking for formal/de jure, not de facto 
(substantive), equality.109 In contrast to this, it can be argued that almost all Articles of 
the Convention contain phrases ‘on equal terms with men’ and that both the preamble and 
Articles 2 and 3 make it clear that the Convention is not only concerned with de jure, but 
also de facto, substantive equality.110 This understanding of Article 7 has been enhanced 
through several General and Concluding Observations by the CEDAW Committee. The 
Committee in its General Recommendation No. 23 explicitly argues that the removal of 
de jure barriers is necessary but not sufficient to achieve full and equal participation of 
women.111 
 
De facto equality is reached when women have substantive equality of opportunity – 
i.e. where men and women benefit from substantially the same starting positions to 
participate in public and political life in the way they deem fit.112 Under Article 7, the 
 
107 CEDAW General Recommendation 23, para. 14. 
108 eg the European Convention on Human Rights. 
109 See Goldschmidt, Verhage, ‘Participation in binnen – en buitenlands beleid’ in Heringa, Hes and 
Lijnzaad (eds.) Het Vrouwenverdrag: een beeld van een verrag (1994), p. 76. 
110 See de Boer ‘The Added Value of the Women’s Convention and the Dutch Case of the Christian 
Party’ in Westendorp (ed.) The Women’s Convention Turned 30 (2012), pp. 163-185, 169. 
111 Cedaw General Recommendation 23, para. 15. 
112 Wittkopp ‘Article 7 CEDAW’ in Freeman, Chinkin and Rudolf (eds.), The UN Convention on the 
Elimination of All Form of Discrimination Against Women – A Commentary (2012), Article 7, p. 199. 
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Committee even employs the concept of equality of results when it asks State parties to 
adopt quotas.113 This would not only require the de jure ability to vote and stand for 
election, but the establishment of opportunities where men and women have substantially 
the same democratic chances in winning a seat in a publicly elected body. This might 
necessitate unequal treatment of men and women in order to counter historically 
determined under-representation.114 
 
Transformative equality in the public and political fields implies a real 
transformation of all public and political institutions as well as society at large, so that 
gender relations in public and political life are no longer grounded in historically 
determined male paradigms of power.115 Two spheres of human life and legal systems, 
the private and the public, have long been viewed as distinct, with men invariably 
dominant in the public sphere associated with politics, government, economics, and the 
workplace.116 Although the Committee has challenged this private-public-dichotomy117, 
the stereotypical view that women belong to the private sphere remains prevalent in many 
societies.118 Article 7 and 5 of the Convention compel State parties to eliminate 
stereotypical perceptions of male and female behaviour and roles in the political and 
public field. The Committee has often highlighted the relationship between stereotypes 
about women and their under-representation and therefore recommended State parties to 
undertake measures to change these perceptions of women’s role in public life.119 
 
A number of State parties have entered reservations that materially affect the 
implementation of Article 7. Most concern the obligations under Article 7 (b).120 The 
 
113 See CO Burkina Faso CEDAW/C/GTM/CO/8-9 and CO Guatemala CEDAW/C/BFA/CO/7 (2017). 
114 S Wittkopp ‘Article 7 CEDAW’ in Freeman, Chinkin and Rudolf (eds.), The UN Convention on the 
Elimination of All Form of Discrimination Against Women – A Commentary (2012), Article 7, p. 210. 
115 Ibid, at 211. 
116 Charlesworth ‘Human Rights as Men’s Rights’ in J.S. Peters and A. Wolper (eds.), Women’s Rights, 
Human Rights. International Feminist Perspectives (1995), pp. 103-13, 106. 
117 CO Cape Verde CEDAW/C/CPV/CO/6 (2006) para 24 (asking the State to encourage men to 
undertake their fair share of domestic responsibilities so that women can devote times to public and 
political life). 
118 eg Slovakia explained the low representation of women as due to insufficient social demand for such 
participation; CO Slovakia CEDAW/C/SVK/CO/4 (2008) para 38. 
119 eg CO Uruguay A/57/38, 26th Session (2002), para 27; CO Kazakhstan A/56/38, 24th Session (2001) 
para 89,90; CO Cuba A/55/38, 23rd Session (2000) para 262. 
120 Australia on 30 August 2000 concerning combat duties, United Nations, Treaty Series, Vol. 1325, 378; 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, concerning any act done for the purpose of 
ensuring the combat effectiveness of the Armed Forces of the Crown, United Nations, Treaty Series, Vol. 
1423, 412, art A c) as modified on 6 June 2005; Monaco concerning police enforcement duties; New 
Zealand and the Cook Islands, as to police duties involving serving in situations of violence or threat of 
violence. The Cook Islands withdrew its reservations on 30 July 2007, CEDAW, CO Cook Islands 
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CEDAW Committee has urged the respective governments to withdraw them on 
numerous times.121 A number of reservations to Article 7 on service in the military have 
been withdrawn as a result of CEDAW’s interventions.122 
 
Article 7 requires State parties to take ‘all appropriate measures’ to ensure certain 
political rights to women. In order to ensure these rights, it is argued that State parties 
must adopt, inter alia, the measures set out in the general Article 2, 4 and 5.123 The 
measures to be taken range from legislative to administrative and other policy measures 
including TSMs.  
 
The Committee has consistently recommended State parties to adopt temporary 
measures as set out in Article 4 in relation to Article 7 of the Convention.124 The 
Committee further recommends that State parties employ a variety of TSMs, ranging 
from less to more interventionist measures. General Recommendation 23, paragraph 15 
and also concluding observations mention recruiting, financially assisting, and training 
women candidates on leadership and negotiation skills, amending electoral procedures, 
developing campaigns directed at equal participation, establish benchmarks, setting 
numerical goals and timetables, and establishing quotas targeting women for election and 
appointment to public positions like the judiciary or other professional group that plan an 
essential part in the everyday life of all societies. The Committee not only recommends 
State parties to employ quota systems, but also criticises the absence or unwillingness to 
do so.125  
 
Under Article 7, the Committee even employs the concept of equality of results when 
it asks State parties to adopt quotas.126 This would not only require the de jure ability to 
vote and stand for election, but the creation of a circumstance where men and women 
 
CEDAW/C/COK/CO/1 (2007) para 5; Israel, concerning the appointment of women to serve as judge in 
religious courts where it is prohibited by the laws of any of the religious communities. 
121 CEDAW CO Maldives A/56/38 (2001) 24th Session para 131; CO Malaysia CEDAW/C/MYS/CO/2 
(2006) para 10; CO Israel CEDAW/C/ISR/CO/3 (2005) para 26. 
122 New Zealand on 5 July 2007; the Cook Islands on 30 July 2007; Austria on 11 September 2000; 
Belgium on 8 July 2002; Germany on 10 December 2001; Switzerland on 29 April 2004; Thailand on 1 
August 1996. 
123 S Wittkopp ‘Article 7 CEDAW’ in Freeman, Chinkin and Rudolf (eds.), The UN Convention on the 
Elimination of All Form of Discrimination Against Women – A Commentary (2012), Article 7, 214. 
124 The Committee has in its Cos to the reports of States from the 39th Session, ’23 June-10 July 2007’ to 
the 48th Session (17 January-14 February 2011) commended all States to adopt or strengthen TSMs in 
political and public life. 
125 CEDAW General Recommendation 23 para. 29; eg CO Belize CEDAW/C/BLZ/CO/3 (2007) para 17. 
126 See CO Burkina Faso CEDAW/C/GTM/CO/8-9 and CO Guatemala CEDAW/C/BFA/CO/7 (2017). 
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have substantially the same democratic chances in winning a seat in a publicly elected 
body. This might necessitate unequal treatment of men and women in order to counter 
historically determined under-representation.127 
 
Wittkopp states in the CEDAW Commentary that it is not clear whether quotas 
constitute TSMs in accordance with Article 4 (1) of the Convention. At times, quotas are 
mentioned in the enumeration of TSMs that should be adopted; on other occasions, they 
are mentioned as separate, presumably because they are assumed permanent.128 The 
Committee states that quotas should not be applied as a ceiling, but as a minimum 
requirement.129 State parties have an obligation to respect, protect and fulfil the rights 
enshrined in Article 7. The obligation to respect refers to States’ own conduct. De jure 
realisation is brought about by enacting pertinent constitutional or legislative provisions. 
The de facto realisation of these rights, however, requires additional legislative measures 
to abolish indirect discrimination in the public and political field.130 State parties have the 
additional obligation to protect by taking preventive, remedial, punitive, or compensatory 
measures against interference by third parties, specifically political parties, trade unions, 
corporations, and the media. They have the obligation to adopt procedures in order to 
prevent interference with women’s rights to participate in public life. 
 
According to the Committee, additional measures are needed besides the de jure 
realisation to secure the effective enjoyment of entitlements under Article 7 – such as the 
establishment of numerical goals, benchmarks, timetables, and quotas for nomination, 
selection, and promotion.131 To enable the Committee to asses State parties’ 
implementation of Article 7 rights effectively, they must include sufficient information 
and sex-disaggregated data in their reports on women’s participation and representation 
in the various sectors and levels of political and public life.132 Further, the CEDAW 
Committee views numerical goals connected with timeframes and quota systems as a 
‘measure’ in the sense of Article 4 of the Convention. 
 
127 S Wittkopp ‘Article 7 CEDAW’ in Freeman, Chinkin and Rudolf (eds.), The UN Convention on the 
Elimination of All Form of Discrimination Against Women – A Commentary (2012), Article 7, 210. 
128 Ibid, at 215. 
129 eg CO Burundi CEDAW/C/BDI/CO/$ (2008) paras. 19, 20. 
130 S Wittkopp ‘Article 7 CEDAW’ in Freeman, Chinkin and Rudolf (eds.), The UN Convention on the 
Elimination of All Form of Discrimination Against Women – A Commentary (2012), Article 7, 216. 
131 Sweden Combined sixth and seventh report CEDAW/C/SWE/7 (2008) para 198. 
132 S Wittkopp ‘Article 7 CEDAW’ in Freeman, Chinkin and Rudolf (eds.), The UN Convention on the 
Elimination of All Form of Discrimination Against Women – A Commentary (2012), Article 7, p. 217. 
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2 . 2 . 3  B E I J I N G  D E C L A R A T I O N  A N D  P L A T F O R M  F O R  A C T I O N 133 
The Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action was adopted during the Fourth 
World Conference on Women in September 1995. The Platform for Action focuses on 12 
areas concerning the implementation of women’s human rights and sets out an agenda for 
women’s empowerment. The Declaration and Platform build on the results of the 
previous three world conferences on women (Mexico City, Copenhagen and Nairobi134) 
but in comparison to the other outcome documents, the conferences and their outcome 
documents are considered to be significant achievements in explicitly articulating 
women’s rights as human rights. 
 
The Platform for Action includes a series of strategic objectives to eliminate 
discrimination against women and achieve equality between women and men. It involves 
political and legal strategies on a global scale based on a human rights framework. 
 
The Declaration and Platform for Action recognise women’s unequal share of power 
and decision-making as one of the 12 critical areas of concern. The Platform for Action 
outlines concrete actions to ensure women’s equal access to, and full participation in, 
power structures (Strategic Objective G.1), and to increase women’s capacity to 
participate in decision-making and leadership (Strategic Objective G.2).135 The Platform 
further recommends ‘positive measures’ to combat the low proportion of women among 
decision makers, including setting ‘specific targets’ to substantially increase the number 
of women ‘in all governmental and public administration positions.’136  
 
One of the arguments used globally in claims for equal participation of women and 
men and gender quotas is the aforementioned democracy argument. This argument was 
 
133 Report of the Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing, 4-15 September 1995 (A/CONF.177/20 
and Add.1), chap. I, resolution 1, annex I. 
134 UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/30/3520, ‘World Conference of the International Women’s 
Year’, adopted by the General Assembly 15 December 1975; UN General Assembly Resolution 
A/RES/40/108, ‘Implementation of the Nairobi Forward-looking Strategies for the Advancement of 
Women’, adopted by the General Assembly 13 December 1985;  
135 United Nations Division for the Advancement of Women, Department for Economic and Social 
Affairs, ‘Equal Participation of women and men in decision-making processes, with particular emphasis 
on political participation and leadership’ Expert group meeting, October 2005, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 
available at: http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/egm/eql-men/, accessed: 1 September 2018. 
136 The United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing, China, September 1995, Platform 
for Action, Chapter G, ‘Women in Power and Decision-Making’, paras. 186 and 190. 
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furthermore included in the Beijing Platform for Action.137 According to Dahlerup, the 
democracy argument implies that ‘only the full inclusion of women will make democracy 
real, and that gender parity signifies that a country is modern and democratic.’138 
Article 181 of the Platform for Action states: ‘Achieving the goal of equal participation 
of women and men in decision-making will provide a balance that more accurately 
reflects the composition of society and is needed in order to strengthen democracy and 
promote its proper functioning.’139 
 
Subsequent reviews of the implementation of the Beijing Declaration and Platform 
for Action have revealed that although significant progress has been made in some areas 
of women’s human rights, ‘discriminatory legislation as well as harmful traditional and 
customary practices and negative stereotyping of women and men still persist’.140 
Particularly, this is can be observed in family, civil, penal, labour, and commercial laws 
or codes, or administrative rules and regulations.141 The 2005 and 2010 reviews of the 
Platform further concluded that de jure and de facto equality had not been achieved in 
any country in the world. 142 The 2010 review noted that even where legal reforms had 
taken place, they were often ineffectively enforced.143 In the last review from 2015, the 
20-year-review, it is claimed that despite a steady increase in women’s political 
representation and participation in parliaments, women remain significantly under-
represented at the highest levels of political participation as well as across the public and 
private sector.144 The summary report further emphasises the persistence of 
discrimination, gender bias, threat of violence, harassment and intimidation in political 
institutions as a contributing factor to the low levels of women’s political participation.145 
 
2 . 2 . 4  T H E  D E V E L O P M E N T  G O A L S  
Development today, as Jahan argues, has brought outstanding benefits to people all 
around the world who have gained in terms of education, health and income. 
Nevertheless, it is imperative for gender equality discussions to focus on the gendered 
 
137 D Dahlerup, ‘Has Democracy Failed Women?’ (2018), Polity Press, Cambridge, p. 17. 
138 Ibid. 
139 Beijing Platform for Action, 1995. 
140 UN General Assembly Resolution S-23/3, annex. Para. 27. 
141 OHCR, ‘Women’s Rights are Human Rights’ (2014), available at: 
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Events/WHRD/WomenRightsAreHR.pdf, accessed 3 October 2018. 
142 E/2010/4-E/CN.6/2010/02, paras. 307-210. 
143 Ibid. 
144 UN Women, ‘The Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action Turns 30 – Summary Report’ (2015).  
145 Ibid.  
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nature of development and challenge the capitalist paradigm of international development 
that creates and recreates gender disparities. 146 
 
The UN General Assembly adopted two resolutions in the past 20 years with specific 
goals, which, amongst other things, promote the achievement of gender equality and 
women’s empowerment. The first resolution consists of the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs) 147, the subsequent resolution of the Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs) 148. 
 
2 . 2 . 4 . 1  M I L L E N N I U M  D E V E L O P M E N T  G O A L S  
The Millennium Development Goals were adopted by the United Nations General 
Assembly in September 2000. The MDGs are part of a resolution and therefore constitute 
non-binding policy. 
 
Gender equality and women’s empowerment is the third of eight MDGs. Its last sub-
indicator for monitoring progress on gender equality and women’s empowerment relates 
to the number of seats held by women in national parliaments. It moves the focus of 
empowerment into the arena of politics, and the struggle for participation and 
representation in decision-making bodies and structures.149 
 
2 . 2 . 4 . 2  S U S T A I N A B L E  D E V E L O P M E N T  G O A L S  
The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) were adopted by the United Nations 
General Assembly in September 2015, 15 years after the adoption of the MDGs.  
 
The SDGs are 17 goals with 169 targets that all 191 UN Member States have 
committed to try to achieve by the year 2030.150 The new agenda, which builds on the 
 
146 Jahan, ‘Institutional Mechanisms for the Advancement of Women’ United Nations Division for the 
Advancement of Women, Paper Presentation (March 1999), New York, USA. 
147 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 55/2 ‘United Nations Millennium Declaration’, U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/55/2, adopted on 18 September 2000. 
148 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 70/1 ‘Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development’, U.N. Doc. A/RES/70/1, adopted on 25 September 2015. 
149 Kabeer, ‘Gender equality and women’s empowerment: A critical analysis of the third millennium 
development goal 1’ (2010), Gender & Development, 13:1, pp. 13-24, 21. 
150 See United Nations General Assembly Resolution 70/1 ‘Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development’, U.N. Doc. A/RES/70/1, adopted on 25 September 2015. 
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MDGs, aims to be relevant to all countries and focuses on structural solutions to meet the 
needs of women, children and the poorest, most disadvantaged people. 
 
Goal 5 sets out the achievement of gender equality and empowerment of all women 
and girls. Target 5.5 further states that States must ensure women’s full and effective 
participation and equal opportunities for leadership at all levels of decision-making in 
political, economic and public life. According to 5.5.1 and 5.5.2, leading indicators could 
be the proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments and local governments 
as well as the proportion of women in managerial positions. 
 
2 . 3  R E G I O N A L  L E G A L  F R A M E W O R K  
As this dissertation will analyse the impact of electoral gender quotas on the basis of 
three case studies, Rwanda, Uganda, and France, it is crucial to outline the corresponding 
regional legal frameworks, in the African and European systems. The outline will be brief 
and focuses on relevant provisions only. 
 
2 . 3 . 1  A F R I C A  
The African human rights and more specifically women’s rights system consists of 
three main legal frameworks, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Banjul 
Charter), the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights 
of Women in Africa (Maputo Protocol), the African Charter on Democracy, Elections 
and Governance, and the Charter of the African Union (AU Charter). 
 
The African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance was adopted in 2007 
and entered into force in 2012. As of September 2018, it has 46 signatory State parties. 
Both, Rwanda and Uganda have signed the treaty. In contrast to Uganda, which has not 
ratified the Charter, Rwanda ratified it in 2010.151 Provisions relevant to this dissertation 
include Articles 3, 8, and 29. Article 3 sets out the principle of the Charter. Amongst other 
these include: 
 
‘3. Promotion of a system of government that is representative; 
 
151 African Union, List of countries which have signed, ratified/acceded the African Charter on 
Democracy, Elections and Governance, 21/09/2018, available at: 
https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/7790-sl-
african_charter_on_democracy_elections_and_governance.pdf, accessed 26/12/2018. 
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6. Promotion of gender equality in public and private institutions 
11. Strengthening political pluralism and recognising the role, rights and responsibilities 
of legally constituted political parties, including opposition political parties, which 
should be given status under national law.’ 
 
Article 8 sets out that State parties ‘shall eliminate all forms of discrimination, 
especially those based on political opinion, gender …’. Further, it also calls State parties 
to adopt legislative and administrative measures to guarantee the rights of women. 
Regarding the role of women in a democracy, Article 29 explicitly mandates State parties 
to create conditions for ‘full and active participation of women in the decision-making 
processes and structures at all levels as a fundamental element in the promotion and 
exercise of a democratic culture.’ Additionally, according to Article 29 (3), State parties 
are to take ‘all possible measures to encourage the full and active participation of women 
in the electoral process and ensure gender parity in representation at all level, including 
legislatures.’ Although the Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance does not 
explicitly name affirmative measures such as quotas, these can be read into Article 29, in 
accordance with Articles 3 and 8. 
 
The Banjul Charter was adopted in 1981, entered into force in 1986 and has been 
ratified by 54 States as of July 2017.152 Provisions that are relevant to this dissertation 
include Articles 18, 19, and 47. According to Article 18 (3), ‘the State shall ensure the 
elimination of every discrimination against women and also ensure the protection of the 
rights of woman and the child as stipulated in international declarations and conventions.’ 
Article 19 states that all peoples shall be equal. The Banjul Charter was criticised for the 
omission of women’s rights, despite the fact that women brought issues on gender 
inequalities to the African agenda through their participation in liberation struggles, and 
also for the emphasis given to cultural values, which appeared to contradict norms 
regarding women’s rights.153 The adoption of the Maputo protocol sought to address these 
omissions.154 
 
 
152 African Union, List of countries which have signed, ratified/acceded to the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights, 15/06/2018, available at: https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/7770-sl-
african_charter_on_human_and_peoples_rights_2.pdf, accessed 26/12/2018. 
153 O Martin, ‘The African Union’s Mechanisms to Foster Gender Mainstreaming and Ensure Women’s 
Political Participation and Representation’ (2013), International IDEA, 12. 
154 Ibid. 
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The Maputo Protocol was adopted in July 2003 and came into effect in 2005. As of 
October 2018, the Protocol has been ratified by 40 States of the 53 AU Nations.155 Both 
Rwanda and Uganda became State parties to the Protocol in 2004 and 2010 
respectively.156 According to Article 2 of the Maputo Protocol, ‘State parties shall combat 
all forms of discrimination against women through appropriate legislative, institutional 
and other measures.’ Therefore Article 2 suggests that State parties shall enact and 
implement appropriate legislative and/or regulatory measures (b)), integrate a gender 
perspective in their policy decisions, legislation, and development plans (c)), and take 
corrective and positive actions in areas, where discrimination against women de jure and 
de facto continues to exist (d)).  
 
2 . 3 . 2  E U R O P E  
The most relevant European frameworks with regards to this dissertation’s focus are 
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), Article 2 and 3 of the Treaty on 
European Union (TEU), and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU). The two latter treaties are mostly referred to as ‘the Treaties’ but for the sake of 
clarity this term will not be used. 
 
The European Convention on Human Rights sets forth a number of fundamental 
rights and freedoms, such as the right to life, prohibition of torture, and the right to a fair 
trial, amongst others. More rights are granted by the additional protocols to the 
Convention. As of December 2018, 47 States including France ratified the Convention.157 
The most relevant provision is the one prohibiting discrimination in Article 14. According 
to this provision, the rights and freedoms ensured by the Convention ‘shall be secured 
without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion’, 
amongst other grounds. 
 
The TEU has significant provisions in Articles 2 and 3. According to Article 2 the 
Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity. These values are further 
 
155 African Union, List of countries which have signed, ratified/acceded to the Protocol of the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, 20/10/2018, available at: 
https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/7783-sl-
protocol_to_the_african_charter_on_human_and_peoples_rights_on_the_rights_of_women_in_africa_7.p
df, accessed: 26/12/2018. 
156 Ibid. 
157 Council of Europe, Treaty Office, Chart of signatures and ratification of Treaty 005 – Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 27/12/2018. 
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common to Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, 
justice, solidarity, and equality between women and men prevail. Furthermore, the Union 
shall combat social exclusion and discrimination, and promote equality between women 
and men (Article 3 (3)). 
 
According the TFEU, the Union shall aim to eliminate inequalities, and to promote 
equality between men and women (Article 8). Further, it expects State parties to ensure 
full equality in practice between men and women in working life. The principle of equal 
treatment shall not prevent any Member State from maintaining or adopting measures 
providing for specific advantages in order to make it easier for the underrepresented sex 
to pursue a vocation or to prevent or compensate for disadvantages in professional careers 
(Article 157 (4)). 
 
In comparison to the African framework, the European Conventions do not explicitly 
promote gender quotas for decision-making bodies in legislative offices. One reasons for 
this might be that the European treaties and conventions are older and do not take gender 
into account, when naming grounds for discrimination. In contrast to the European 
system, the African human rights system is contemporary and informed by conflicts such 
as the Rwandan genocide. Nonetheless, the lack of explicit encouragement or legal basis 
for such affirmative actions in the European system, does not preclude reading into the 
named provisions. 
 
2 . 4  C O N C L U S I O N  
The Human Rights Commission (HRC) refers to affirmative actions in order to 
achieve gender equality in political decision-making bodies and refers to CEDAW 
provisions and the CEDAW Committee’s General Recommendations in its General 
Comments.158 Positive State obligations are largely not included, although the 
commentary of the ICCPR and General Comments address systematic discrimination 
within the public and political sphere (particularly for elected offices) and indicate tools 
for its eradication, such as affirmative legal measures. In contrast to CEDAW, no positive 
obligations can be read out of Article 25 regarding a State parties’ duties. The HRC has 
 
158 M Nowak, ‘U.N. Convention on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary’ (N.P. Engel, Kehl, 
2005), Art. 25, para. 22. 
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not yet changed this traditional interpretation of Article 25 of the ICCPR, although one 
might read its references to CEDAW and the General Recommendations as an indication 
for future modifications. 
 
In contrast to the ICCPR and the work of the ICCPR’s treaty body, CEDAW moved 
the right of political participation another step towards de facto equality by affirming the 
obligation of State parties to take affirmative action to accelerate the participation of 
women in politics and their representation in other public decision-making bodies. 
Through Article 7 and the Committee’s interpretations via General Recommendation No. 
23 and its Concluding Observations to State parties, it is clear that CEDAW promotes the 
use of electoral gender quotas to gain de facto / substantive equality for women in public 
offices or more generic, in the public field. Under Article 7, State parties to CEDAW have 
the obligation to ensure the establishment of substantive equality within the political life, 
and therefore within legislative decision-making bodies and women’s access to them 
through elections. Nevertheless, CEDAW recommends quotas as a temporary special 
measure, rather than a permanent policy or national law. 
 
Two spheres of human life and legal systems, the private and the public, have long 
been viewed as distinct, with men invariably dominant in the public sphere associated 
with politics, government, economics, and the workplace.159 Although the CEDAW 
Committee has challenged this private-public-dichotomy160, the stereotypical view that 
women belong to the private sphere remains prevalent in many societies.161 Article 7 and 
5 of the Convention compel State parties to eliminate stereotypical perceptions of male 
and female behaviour and roles in the political and public field. The Committee has often 
highlighted the relationship between stereotypes about women and their under-
representation and therefore recommended State parties to undertake measures to change 
these perceptions of women’s role in public life.162 
 
 
159 Charlesworth ‘Human Rights as Men’s Rights’ in J.S. Peters and A. Wolper (eds.), Women’s Rights, 
Human Rights. International Feminist Perspectives (1995) 103-13, 106. 
160 CO Cape Verde CEDAW/C/CPV/CO/6 (2006) para 24 (asking the State to encourage men to 
undertake their fair share of domestic responsibilities so that women can devote times to public and 
political life). 
161 eg Slovakia explained the low representation of women as due to insufficient social demand for such 
participation; CO Slovakia CEDAW/C/SVK/CO/4 (2008) para 38. 
162 eg CO Uruguay A/57/38, 26th Session (2002), para 27; CO Kazakhstan A/56/38, 24th Session (2001) 
para 89,90; CO Cuba A/55/38, 23rd Session (2000) para 262. 
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CEDAW’s provisions and its interpretations through General Recommendations and 
Concluding Observations by the Committee are further strengthened by non-binding 
General Assembly Resolutions such as the United Nations Millennium Declaration, the 
United Nations Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Beijing Declaration and 
Platform for Action.  
 
Apart from international provisions, treaties and conventions, the case study 
countries have to take into account the relevant regional legal frameworks. These 
frameworks, especially in Africa, promote the empowerment of women in decision-
making bodies and ask State parties to ensure the equality of men and women in every 
aspect of the State. 
 40 
C H A P T E R  T H R E E       C A S E  S T U D I E S  
 
3 . 1  I N T R O D U C T I O N  
This chapter will provide background information on the three countries serving as 
case studies – Rwanda, Uganda, and France. Furthermore, each country’s specific quota 
regulation, the status quo of women’s participation, and an introduction to the quotas’ 
potential impact on women’s lives and women’s substantive representation will be 
discussed. Moreover, the chapter’s purpose and aim lie in the portrayal of the existing 
legislation in the aforementioned three countries. 
 
This chapter will analyse the connection between women’s interests, their 
representation, and substantive gender equality, linking them to electoral gender quotas 
for legislative decision-making bodies. In order to measure the impact of each country’s 
quota regulation on the representation of women, I will reference latest country reports 
to the CEDAW Committee and the Committee’s Concluding Observations. Conclusions 
can also be drawn from the content of national plenary debates.163 
 
Quotas for women entail that women must constitute a certain number or percentage 
of the members of a body, whether it is a candidate list of a political party, a 
parliamentary assembly, a committee, or the executive, as stated by Dahlerup.164 Quotas 
aim to increase women’s representation in publicly elected or appointed institutions such 
as governments, parliaments and local councils. Dahlerup argues that ‘they draw 
legitimacy from the discourse of exclusion, according to which the main reasons for 
women’s under-representation are the exclusionary practices of the political parties and 
the political institutions at large.’ Ideally, quotas force those who nominate and select, to 
start recruiting and giving women a chance to equally participate in the political 
landscape.165 
 
 
163 See for Uganda: A Clayton, C Josefsson, V Wang, ‘Quotas and Women’s Substantive Representation: 
Evidence from a Content Analysis of Ugandan Plenary Debates’ (2017), Politics & Gender 13, pp. 276-
304 
164 D Dahlerup, ‘Increasing Women’s Political Representation: New Trends in Gender Quotas’ in 
Women in Parliament: Beyond Numbers, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 
(2005), pp. 141-174, 144. 
165 Ibid. 
 41 
The concept of ‘substantive representation’, as noted by Drude Dahlerup, ‘addresses the 
relationship between the represented and their representatives’.166 Regarding the analysis 
of substantive representation, this dissertation will make use of the perspective used by 
Franceschet. Her framework consists of process-oriented and outcome-oriented 
representation. According to Franceschet, process-oriented presentation occurs when a 
woman legislator performs activities on behalf of women. Outcome-oriented 
representation refers to the kind of representation which effectively results in specific 
outcomes, like policies enhancing women’s rights and lives.167 When analysing each 
country-case study, this dissertation will focus on both, the process-oriented and the 
outcome-oriented representation as an indicator for substantive representation of women 
and the potential impact of gender quotas. 
 
The following sections will outline the quota system for legislative decision-making 
bodies in Rwanda, Uganda, and France, and also preclude some information on each 
country’s political-historical background. 
 
3 . 2  R W A N D A  
This section will give an overview of the current and past situation in Rwanda 
regarding women’s participation in the highest legislative decision-making bodies. It will 
analyse the impact of Rwandan gender-quotas on the representation of women in the 
country. 
 
The Rwandan government has pursued three kinds of quotas for women: reserved 
seats (1), party quotas (2), and legislative quotas (3). Party quotas have been pursued by 
all political parties since 1999, whereas reserved seats and legislative quotas were 
instituted by the 2003 Rwandan constitution. The Rwandan case is relevant for this study 
and the debate about gender quotas, as the country is ‘frequently cited as a success story 
in terms of the impact of quotas.’168 In 2008, Rwanda became the first and only country 
in the world with a majority-female, national legislative body. In September 2018, 
 
166 D Dahlerup, ‘Has Democracy Failed Women?’ (2018), Cambridge: Polity Press, p. 95. 
167 S Franceschet, JM Piscopo, ‘Gender Quotas and Women’s Substantive Representation – Lessons 
from Argentina’ (2008), Politics and Gender (4), pp. 393-425, 396. 
168 E Burnet, ‘Women’s Empowerment and Cultural Change in Rwanda’ in Franceschet, ML Krook, JM 
Piscopos (eds.), The Impact of Gender Quotas, S (2012), pp. 190-207, 190 f. 
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women won 61.3 per cent of seats in Rwanda’s lower house of Parliament.169 Rwanda 
ranks first among all countries, in terms of the number of women elected to parliament. 
 
3 . 2 . 1  T H E  P O L I T I C A L - H I S T O R I C A L  B A C K G R O U N D  
First and foremost, a portrayal of the Rwandan background is indispensable to 
understand why Rwanda is where it is today when it comes to women’s participation in 
legislative bodies. This includes the 1994 genocide, which ‘more than any other event in 
recent Rwandan history’ shaped the country’s current political landscape, as Schwartz 
notes.170 
 
In the Rwandan genocide almost one million Rwandans, primarily Tutsi and 
politically-moderate Hutu, lost their lives in massacres. The genocide took place between 
April and July 1994 and occurred in the middle of the civil war which began in 1990 
when the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) – a then rebel movement based in Uganda, 
invaded Rwanda.171  
 
Longman argues that in comparison to the violence against the Tutsi in the early 
1960s and in 1973, the 1994 genocide targeted specifically women.172 The violence 
perpetrated in 1994 was much more widespread than anything known in Rwanda before, 
partly because of the strong ideology which was used to encourage this violence and the 
elimination of limits that had previously protected women.173 Taylor claims that this 
widespread violence represented a backlash against the social and political advances that 
women had made in the previous decade, concluding that the genocide has a clearly 
gendered aspect.174 It is within this context than one has to analyse the impact of electoral 
gender quotas on the Rwandan society and more specifically on Rwandan women. 
 
 
169 Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), ‘Women in national parliaments’ World Classification (2018), 
available at: http://archive.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif.htm, accessed 12 September 2018. 
170 H Schwartz, ‘Women’s Representation in the Rwandan Parliament’ (2004), Department of Political 
Science, Gothenburg University, Sweden, 8. 
171 Devlin, Elgie, ‘The Effect of Increased Women’s Representation in Parliament: The Case of Rwanda’ 
(2008), Parliamentary Affairs Vol. 61, No. 2, pp. 237-254, 241. 
172 T Longman, ‘Rwanda: Achieving Equality or Serving an Authoritarian State?’, in Women in African 
Parliaments, G Bauer, HE Britton (eds.), 2006, pp. 133-151, 136. 
173 Ibid, at 137. 
174 Taylor, ‘Sacrifice as Terror: The Rwandan Genocide’ (1999), Oxford. 
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The genocide ended in July 1994, when the RPF seized the capital Kigali. Shortly 
after this, the RPF named a transitional government, the ‘Government of National Unity’ 
(GNU).175 The GNU continued until 1998, when the government launched a transition 
called ‘democratisation.’ In 2003, the new constitution was approved through a national 
referendum followed by presidential and parliamentary elections in August and 
September of the same year. As a result of these elections, Rwanda displaced Sweden as 
the country with the world’s highest percentage of women in its lower or single house of 
parliament.176 The elections were criticised by international observers as falling short of 
normal standards of ‘free and fair’.177 Freedom House178 even classified Rwanda as ‘Not 
Free’ and branding it as a non-electoral democracy in accordance with their criteria.179  
 
The Rwandan political system is nominally multi-party, but in practice one can 
observe a single-party system with the RPF functioning as a state party. Schwartz notes 
that ‘while the Parliament is majority female, most of the women are card-carrying 
members of the RPF or its coalition partners.’180 She further states: ‘Women elected to 
seats reserved for women were nominated, or at least vetted, by the RPF via the Forum 
of Political Parties, an umbrella organization that all political parties must join.’181 
Schwartz and other authors conclude that many of these women owe allegiance to the 
RPF.182 This might indicate that the Rwandan experiences may not be comparable as a 
case study within this research. However, Devlin and Elgie suggest that Rwanda is a 
useful case study to examine by which conclusions can still be reliably drawn. They argue 
that ‘even though Rwanda may be an authoritarian society, it is one in which women 
 
175 E Burnet, ‘Women Have Found Respect: Gender Quotas, Symbolic Representation and Female 
Empowerment in Rwanda’ (2011), Georgia State University, p. 7 f. 
176 T Longman, ‘Rwanda: Achieving Equality or Serving an Authoritarian State?’, in Women in African 
Parliaments, Bauer, Britton (eds.), 2006, pp. 133-151, 133. 
177 EU Election Observation Mission (EOM) to Rwanda-2003, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/comm/ 
 external_relations/human_rights/eu_election_ass_observ/rwanda/prelim.htm#, accessed: 9 November 
2018.   
178 Freedom House is a NGO that conducts research and advocacy on democracy, political freedom, and 
human rights. The organisation releases an annual ‘Freedom in the World report’, which assesses each 
country’s degree of political freedoms and civil liberties. 
179 Freedom House rated Rwanda as ‘Not Free’ in its 2010 annual report, Freedom in the World. 
180 H Schwartz, ‘Women’s Representation in the Rwandan Parliament’ (2004), Department of Political 
Science, Gothenburg University, Sweden, 8. 
181 Ibid. 
182 H Schwartz, ‘Women’s Representation in the Rwandan Parliament’ (2004), Department of Political 
Science, Gothenburg University, Sweden, 8; T Longman, ‘Rwanda: Achieving Equality or Serving an 
Authoritarian State?’, in Women in African Parliaments, Bauer, Britton (eds.), 2006, pp. 133-151. 
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have a considerable and active presence’183, and, women’s representation in Rwandan 
parliament has increased as rapidly as never seen before. I agree with Devlin and Elgie 
that Rwanda does provide a reliable case for analysing the effect of women’s 
representation in legislative decision-making bodies on policy outcomes and women’s 
substantive representation.184 
 
While the 1994 genocide and the civil war devastated women’s groups, with many 
of its leaders and members dead or in exile, Longman states that the ‘intense problems 
facing women in the post-conflict period inspired women’s organisations to assume an 
important social role.’185 Various women’s groups have enjoyed the growing public 
influence which translated itself into public political power. Working closely with the 
Forum for Women Parliamentarian (FWP), women’s civil society organisations pushed 
successfully for the adoption of laws banning discrimination against women as well as 
for an important reform of inheritance laws which grant women the right to inherit their 
husbands’ property. Longman argues that the involvement of women in Rwandan civil 
society has been a major reason for the expansion of women’s representation in Rwanda 
for two reasons: first, activism in civil society is an important basis for entering politics, 
and second, women’s groups have actively promoted the legitimacy and importance of 
women holding office. 186 
 
3 . 2 . 2  S T A T U S  Q U O :  Q U O T A  L A W S  A N D  W O M E N ’ S  P A R T I C I P A T I O N   
Post genocide, the RPF came into power with a strong commitment to women’s 
rights and to women’s representation in general. During the GNU (1993-2003) the 
number of women in parliament grew steadily. Prior to the 2003 election, women made 
up 25.7 per cent of the Rwandan parliament. 187 
 
In 2003, Rwanda adopted a new constitution. The preamble of the constitution cites 
human rights instruments and conventions to which Rwanda is a signatory, including 
 
183 C Devlin, R Elgie, ‘The Effect of Increased Women’s Representation in Parliament: The Case of 
Rwanda’ (2008), Parliamentary Affairs Vol. 61, No. 2, pp. 237-254, 24. 
184 Ibid, at 24 f. 
185 T Longman, ‘Rwanda: Achieving Equality or Serving an Authoritarian State?’, in Women in African 
Parliaments, Bauer, Britton (eds.), 2006, pp. 133-151, 137-139. 
186 Ibid. 
187 Ibid, at 144. 
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CEDAW.188 Within the constitution there is a mandatory minimum 30 per cent gender 
quota in all decision-making bodies (Article 9). The constitution explicitly recognises the 
responsibility of political organisations to ‘participate in the education of citizens on 
politics based on democracy and election and operate in such a manner as to ensure that 
women and men have equal access to elective offices’.189 Article 76 stipulates that 24 of 
the 80 members of the Chamber of Deputies shall be female.190 Article 82 sets forth the 
quota of 30 per cent women in the Senate and states that ‘the organs responsible in the 
nomination of Senators shall take into account national unity and equal representation of 
both sexes.’191  
 
The Senate is an appointed body, with members selected by provincial councils, the 
political parties, the universities, and the president ‘to ensure the representation of 
historically marginalised communities.’ In comparison, the 24 seats in the lower house 
(Chamber of Deputies) reserved for women are contested in ‘women-only election’, 
meaning only women can stand for election and further only women can vote. In addition 
to the quota-secured 24 seats, 14 additional women were elected in openly-competed 
seats during 2003. In 2008, women made up 56 per cent of the Chamber of Deputies, 
whereas in 2013, 64 per cent of the Chamber of deputies were women. After the recent 
2018 election, the parliament now consists of 61 per cent women.192 In comparison, the 
global average of women representatives in the single or lower house of parliament is 24 
per cent.193 
 
Kanakuze, who was part of the 12-member constitutional commission where she 
represented civil society, called Rwanda’s new constitution a ‘major watershed’ for 
women.194 Nonetheless, ‘it is important to note, that although the constitution is very 
progressive, in terms of equal rights, gender equality, and women’s representation, it is 
 
188 E Powley, ‘The Legislative Priorities of Rwandan Women Parliamentarians’ (2008), The Initiative for 
Inclusive Security, Hunt Alternatives Fund, 8. 
189 Article 52 of the Rwandan Constitution, Amendment 2 of 8 December 2005. 
190 H Ballington, ‘The Implementation of Quotas: African Experience’ (2004), for IDEA, p. 73. 
191 Ibid. 
192 UN Women, ‘Revisiting Rwanda five years after record-breaking parliamentary elections’, available 
at: http://www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2018/8/feature-rwanda-women-in-parliament, accessed 
12 November 2018. 
193 IPU, Women in National Parliaments, available at: http://archive.ipu.org/wmn-e/world.htm, accessed 
12 November 2018. 
194 J Kanakuze, ‘Quotas in Practice: The Challenge of Implementation and Enforcement in Rwanda’ 
(2003), IDEA. 
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limited in other important ways’, as Powley emphasises. Concerns that have been raised 
include those about restrictions on freedom of speech, around ethnicity/ethnic diversity, 
as well as the seven-year presidential term.195 
 
Despite the authoritarian functioning of the RPF, it has mainstreamed women from 
the beginning in many of its policies.196 This includes the creation of the Ministry of 
Gender and Women Promotion in 1999. According to the Rwandan government ‘it was 
set up to focus on gender equality and women’s empowerment with a special focus on 
mainstreaming gender in different institutions, particularly Government ministries.’ In 
2005 the Ministry was renamed the ‘Ministry of Gender and Family Promotion’ with the 
mission on gender equality, family promotion, and child protection. Although the 
ministry’s name changed throughout the years, its goal to promote gender equality and 
its special focus on mainstreaming gender in different Government institutions, remained 
the same, as claimed by the Rwandan Government.197 Nonetheless, the change of name 
could have had negative implications for women as it dilutes the focus of the Ministry 
from women only issues/interests to those of family, emphasising the existence of the 
private-public dichotomy. 
 
3 . 2 . 3  P O L I C I E S  A N D  L A W S  P O S T - C O N F L I C T   
Rwanda is frequently cited as a success story when it comes to the effect and impact 
of gender quotas on women’s life. In contrast, Devlin and Elgie argue that, although 
women’s issues in Rwanda are now more easily raised than before, the increased 
representation of women has had only ‘little effect on policy outputs.’198 I argue that this 
view is not applicable any longer and that the increase of women in the Rwandan political 
landscape has led to change that ultimately has the goal of substantive gender equality 
and the promotion and protection of women’s rights. This will be demonstrated by 
 
195 E Powley, ‘The Legislative Priorities of Rwandan Women Parliamentarians’ (2008), The Initiative for 
Inclusive Security, Hunt Alternatives Fund, 9. See also: Longman, ‘Rwanda: Achieving Equality or 
Serving an Authoritarian State?’, in Women in African Parliaments, Bauer, Britton (eds.), 2006; C H 
Hogg, ‘Women’s Political Representation in Post-Conflict Rwanda: A Politics of Inclusion or 
Exclusion?’ (2009), Journal of International Women’s Studies Vol. 11, p. 34. 
196 E Burnet, ‘Women Have Found Respect: Gender Quotas, Symbolic Representation and Female 
Empowerment in Rwanda’ (2011), Georgia State University, 9. 
197 Ministry of Gender and Family Promotion, ‘Historical Background of The Ministry of Gender and 
Family Promotion’, January 2018, available at: http://www.migeprof.gov.rw/about-us/history/, 
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making reference to laws and policies, adopted by the Rwandan government in the past 
two decades and by referencing recent Country Reports to the CEDAW Committee and 
the Committee’s corresponding Concluding Observations. 
 
Various pieces of legislation have extended and broadened the rights of women since 
the 1994 genocide. These include the achievement of Category One status for rape or 
sexual torture victims in the post-genocide prosecution guidelines (1996)199, a law 
extending the rights of pregnant and breast-feeding mothers in the workplace (1997), a 
law on the protection of children from violence (2001)200, the Inheritance Act (2003), 
and the gender-sensitive Rwandan constitution itself (2003)201.202 Although these law 
were passed when the number of women in Rwandan parliament was smaller than today 
and pre-quota, they are still noticeable legal achievements in post-conflict Rwanda.  
 
The ‘Law on the Prevention, Protection and Punishment of Any Gender-Based 
Violence’203 is the first law post-quota which promotes women’s rights. Among other 
things, it prohibits polygamy and provides a legal definition of rape of an adult women, 
although marital rape is not on the same level as rape outside of marriage. Further, the 
land policy adopted in 2004 was complemented in 2013 by the new law governing land 
in Rwanda. Article 4 prohibits all forms of discrimination based on sex in relation to 
access to land and the enjoyment of real rights. Another law was passed in 2009 
regulating labour in Rwanda and prohibiting discrimination on the grounds of gender, 
marital status or family responsibilities. Discriminatory provisions towards women in the 
family law, in the commercial code of 1988, and in the Penal Code were revoked. 
 
Furthermore, the Rwandan government introduced national machineries for the 
advancement of women such as the Ministry of Gender and Family Promotion, the 
 
199 Rwanda: Organic Law No. 08/1996 of 1996 on the Organization of Prosecutions for Offenses 
constituting the Crime of Genocide or Crimes Against Humanity committed since 1 October 1990. 
200 Rwanda: Law No. 27/2001 of 2001 Relating to Rights and Protection of the Child Against 
Violence, 28 April 2001. 
201 The Constitution stipulates in the preamble its commitment to ‘ensuring equal rights between 
Rwandans and between women and men without prejudice to the principles of gender equality and 
complementarity in national development’. Republic of Rwanda Constitution 2003, Official gazette 
special number 04/06/2003. 
202 C Devlin, R Elgie, ‘The Effect of Increased Women’s Representation in Parliament: The Case of 
Rwanda’ (2008), Parliamentary Affairs Vol. 61, No. 2, pp. 237-254, 249. 
203 Rwanda: Law No. 59/2008 of 2008 on Prevention and Punishment of Gender-Based Violence, 
10 September 2008. 
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Gender Monitoring office, the National Women Council, and the National Commission 
for Children. The National Gender Policy was approved by the Government in 2010. Its 
Strategic Plan institutionalised the National Gender Cluster as a coordination mechanism 
that aims at supporting the Rwandan Government in promoting gender equality, as noted 
in the Government’s 7th-9th Periodic Report to the CEDAW Committee. The first Gender 
Cluster Strategic Plan 2010-2012 contained provisions of CEDAW and the Beijing 
Platform for Action. Further, the Girls Education Policy, the Agriculture Sector Gender 
Mainstreaming Strategy, the Media Gender Mainstreaming Strategy, and the Rwanda 
National Police Gender Mainstreaming policy were introduced. In 2012, Rwanda also 
developed a five year (2012-2017) National Implementation Plan of the Beijing 
Declaration and Platform for Action. A report on the implementation of the Declaration 
and the Platform for Action was submitted to the United Nations General Assembly in 
2014.204 
 
Leaders of Pro-Femmes, one of the most influential women’s groups and 
representation of women’s rights in Rwandan civil society, identified the presence of 
women in parliament and the FWP as an important factor in getting relevant legislation 
passed. The FWP helped as a networking space which strengthened the power of women 
parliamentarians, as they were able to act as a bloc.205 
 
3 . 2 . 4  S U B S T A N T I V E  G E N D E R  E Q U A L I T Y  T H R O U G H  
R E P R E S E N T A T I O N ?  A  R W A N D A N  C A S E - S T U D Y  
Devlin and Elgie argue that the literature on the impact of women’s greater 
representation in the Rwandan parliament provides a contrasting picture of the impact of 
increased women’s representation.206 Powley explicitly draws attention to the early 
legislative achievements of women representatives, including the revoking of laws that 
prohibited women from inheriting land.207 Powley, together with Pearson, also 
demonstrates the impact of women representatives on the drafting of the 2006 bill which 
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addresses gender-based violence.208 In contrast to Powley, Longman questions whether 
women have really achieved much in the authoritarian political environment of Rwanda. 
Nonetheless, he also acknowledges that women representatives have been influential in 
passing reforms in favour of women’s interests, such as laws relating to inheritance, 
discrimination, and rape.209 Burnet finds that gender quotas in Rwanda have ‘generated 
impacts far beyond the political sphere’, leading to significant changes in attitudes 
towards women and the perception of their competence.210  
 
In ‘face-to-face’ interviews of women who were in parliament both prior to the 2003 
elections and who were elected to parliament after 2003, Devlin and Elgie tried to assess 
the effects that women had on the Rwandan parliament.211 They examined the positive 
impact on the general culture of the parliament, stating that with the greater number of 
women, several interviewed representatives felt more comfortable, more confident, and 
more ‘at home’.212 According to the study, one theme that emerged as important in all 
the interviews was the issue of female solidarity. Several female representatives openly 
declared that they put the promotion of women ahead of party politics.213 Furthermore, 
Devlin and Elgie indicate that women are indeed highly aware of their numerical 
strength.214 Nonetheless, they argue, that the interviews failed to reflect changes in some 
other aspects of parliament’s political culture such as ‘the hours worked, the calendar, 
the way meeting were arranged and conducted and formal decision-making processes.’215 
 
Elgie and Devlin, and Schwartz also conducted interviews with Rwandan women 
parliamentarians in order to assess their impact on women’s lives and whether they act 
in the interest of women. Similarly to this dissertation, Schwartz used Wängnerud’s 
definition of the concept of women’s issues, within which she based her work on the first 
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two concerns, namely the recognition of women as a social category and the 
acknowledgement of the unequal power balance between the sexes.216 Her findings 
primarily confirm results from previous research which states that female 
parliamentarians represent women’s interests and issues ‘to a greater extent than male 
parliamentarians in the Rwandan parliament.’217 Furthermore, Schwartz indicates that 
the use of gender quotas for legislative decision-making bodies resulted in a number of 
female parliamentarians who experience a special and strong commitment to women and 
their representation.218 
 
The introduction of gender quotas has had an impact on the descriptive and symbolic 
representation of women in the Rwanda. However, the question remains as to whether 
the increase in descriptive and symbolic representation has led to progress in women’s 
substantive representation. These policies and laws can be seen as an outcome of strong 
lobbyism of civil society organisations and their strong ties to women parliamentarians 
(who mainly emerged out of civil society) and vice versa. As leaders of Pro-Femmes, the 
very influential Rwandan women’s rights organisation identified, the presence of women 
in parliament was and still is an important factor in getting pro-women legislation passed. 
In conclusion, quotas in Rwanda have had an impact on the process-oriented, as well as 
outcome-oriented substantive representation of women. 
 
3 . 3  U G A N D A  
Uganda was one of the first countries in the world to introduce reserved 
parliamentary seats for women in 1989, which enables me to assess the quota’s more 
long-term effect on the representation of women and the equality of gender within 
decision-making bodies. Uganda is a State party to CEDAW as well as the ICCPR. 
Furthermore, it has signed and ratified the Banjul Charter, but not the Maputo Protocol.  
 
Past studies and analysis of gender quotas’ influence on women’s representation in 
Uganda have ‘painted a mixed picture’, as Clayton et al. state.219 
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3 . 3 . 1  T H E  P O L I T I C A L - H I S T O R I C A L  B A C K G R O U N D  
The Ugandan quota system was introduced during what is known as the Movement 
years (1986-2006). Typical for these Movement years was a no-party state where the still 
ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM) was in power. As a justification for the 
introduction of a no-party system, the NRM argued that multiple political parties would 
create ethnic conflict and that an inclusive and consultative no-party democracy would 
bring stability to Uganda.220  
 
In 1989 the NRM regime adopted a system of reserved seats for the disabled, the 
youth, the workers, and women. In the following parliamentary elections, the number of 
reserved seats for women has been expanded through a constant formation of new 
districts. Nonetheless, the Ugandan quota system has been heavily criticised for ‘creating 
a group of legislators more beholden to the NRM in their loyalties than to the cause of 
women’s emancipation.’221 As observed by Tripp, in the 2001 parliamentary elections, 
only two of the women elected to Parliament were not part of the Movement. Tamale has 
noted in interviews she conducted in 1996 that half of the women who won a 
parliamentary seat had served on Museveni’s campaign in their districts. Both Tamale 
and Tripp argue that the ‘NRM patronage politics’ played a role in several victories of 
female NRM loyalists. 
 
Another reason commonly identified for the system’s shortcomings is that until 2006, 
women were elected by the ‘Electoral College’.222 The Electoral College consisted of 
NRM leaders (mostly men) from all five levels of the local government system. At first, 
all legislators were elected via the Electoral College. In the subsequent elections 
however, the county representatives were elected by universal suffrage and the interest 
groups representatives were elected through their own organisations. The only interest 
group not included in these changes were the representatives of women who were still 
being elected by mostly male NRM leaders.223 The Electoral College has been further 
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accused of promoting elite women who have neither had the power nor the will to further 
women’s rights.224 Additionally, the other problem observers have noted is that the 
Electoral College was made up of a relatively small number of people who could have 
easily be bribed or influenced.225  
 
The discussion on how to replace the Electoral College system for the election of 
women’s representatives shifted between universal suffrage on one side and the election 
through women’s organisations on the other side. The majority226 argued for direct 
universal suffrage as it would be more democratic, claiming that women would gain 
greater legitimacy and would be accountable directly to the people whom they are 
supposed to represent.227  
 
In 2006, the NRM reformed the system of the reserved seats election. Since then, 
the district female representatives have been elected by the people in their district, 
reflecting direct universal suffrage. This electoral reform coincided with the country’s 
return to a multiparty system as Ugandans voted for a return to multiparty election in a 
referendum in 2005.228 
  
3 . 3 . 2  S T A T U S  Q U O :  Q U O T A  L A W S  A N D  W O M E N ’ S  P A R T I C I P A T I O N  
Article 78 (1) of the Constitution of Uganda states that the parliament shall consist 
of one women representative for every district. The reserved seats for women are single-
member constituencies. Since the quota policy was adopted in 1989, the number of 
reserved seats for women, and thus the number of districts, has almost tripled, reaching 
112 seats in the recent 2011 elections.229 The parliament is further formed in the 
following way: there are 238 constituency representatives, 112 district women 
representatives directly elected by all voters on a special ballot in each district (for 
women candidates only); ten representatives of the Uganda People’s Defence Forces, of 
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whom two must be women; five youth representatives of whom one must be a woman; 
five representatives of persons with disabilities, of whom one must be a woman; and five 
representatives of workers, of whom one must be a woman.230  
 
Currently, 154 of 449 (33,5 per cent) seats in the Ugandan Parliament are held by 
women. The number of women entering parliament through direct competition with men 
is still relatively small. In the current parliament, women only hold 19 of the 290 open 
seats. 
 
3 . 3 . 3  N A T I O N A L  L E G I S L A T I O N  A N D  P O L I C I E S  P O S T - Q U O T A  
With regards to the impact of reserved seats on pro-women legislation and the 
substantive representation of women, Tripp states that on the whole only few legislative 
gains were made in the period between 1989 and 2006.231 Similarly to Rwanda, the 
access and rights to land, as well as women’s marriage rights have been driving forces 
behind the Ugandan women’s movement.232  
 
According to the CEDAW Committee’s Concluding Observations, Uganda has 
adopted a wide range of legislative measures since the consideration of the State party’s 
third periodic report in 2002 (CEDAW/C/UGA/3). These legislative measures include 
the following: 
 
(a) The Land Act Amendment (2004)233; 
(b) The Employment Act (2006)234; 
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(c) The Equal Opportunities Commission Act (2007), which provides a legal basis 
to challenge laws, policies, customs and traditions that discriminate against 
women, as well as the National Equal Opportunities Policy235; 
(d) The amendments to the Penal Code prohibiting defilement of girls and boys 
(2007)236; 
(e) The Domestic Violence Act (2010), criminalising violence in a domestic 
setting237; 
(f) The Prohibition of Female Genital Mutilation Act (2010)238; 
(g) The Prevention of Trafficking in Persons Act (2010)239; and 
(h) The International Criminal Court Act (2010), criminalising sexual exploitation of 
women during conflict situations240. 
 
The Committee further notes that Uganda has adopted a number of policies, 
programmes, and plans of action to promote gender equality and eliminate discrimination 
against women, as proscribed by the CEDAW Committee. Here, it makes specific 
reference to the National Action Plan on Gender for monitoring the implementation of 
the Convention for the period 2007-2010 as well as the National Gender Policy from 
2007.241 
 
Similar to the Committee’s Concluding Observations, Muriaas and Wang note that 
the number of laws relevant to women enacted in the period after the introduction of the 
multi-party-system and the reform of the Electoral College system is surprising, ‘given 
the relatively unimpressive legislative record of women so far but must be understood 
against the background of the 2011 elections.’ They argue that Musuveni and the NRM 
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needed to position themselves prior to the elections by giving women some victories to 
‘keep them in line’.242 Still, those legislative achievements should not be underestimated, 
as the hard work of different actors, including civil society - especially the Uganda 
Women Parliament Association (UWOPA) - account for the outcome. In the interviews 
conducted by Muriaas and Wang, nearly all legislators expressed UWOPA as a force to 
be reckoned with in parliament.243 Tamale has analysed the role of women in formal 
politics in Uganda. In her analysis she found that female MPs tend to ‘make a case for 
women’, no matter how they were elected, through quotas or the open election.244 
 
Nonetheless, in its Concluding Observations, the Committee urges the Ugandan 
government to enact the Marriage and Divorce Bill, the Sexual Offences Bill and the 
HIV/AIDS Prevention and Control Bill.245 As cited by Muriaas and Wang, the opposition 
member Alaso explained why the Marriage and Divorce Bill is still pending: ‘There are 
issues … that are deeply entrenched in culture. For instance, polygamy, matters of marital 
rape, matters of co-ownership and many other such related matters. Those ones you just 
have to approach bit by bit. If you don’t do, you are in trouble because you will lose the 
whole thing.’246 Muriaas and Wang argue that the reason this bill is still pending is that 
it challenges ‘established power structures, in the sense that it concerns the issue of 
property and seeks to alter basic gender and power relations in society.’ It therefore 
directly affects the majority of power holders who are still men.247 
 
3 . 3 . 4  S U B S T A N T I V E  G E N D E R  E Q U A L I T Y  T H R O U G H  
R E P R E S E N T A T I O N ?  A  U G A N D A N  C A S E - S T U D Y  
Regarding the impact of gender quotas in Uganda, Clayton et al. investigate the 
representation of women through the analysis of legislative speeches in the Ugandan 
parliament. In doing so, they have expanded the scholarship on women’s substantive 
representation beyond an analysis of pro-women policy outcomes, taking a more process, 
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rather than outcome-oriented approach.248 They chose to use the contents of Members of 
Parliament (MP) speeches during plenary debates as an indicator of women’s substantive 
representation. Within their research they created three categories, quota-elected women, 
non-quota-elected women, and men. The dataset they used consists of 14 years of speech 
transcripts from 500 MPs and more than 40.000 pages of Hansard text. It consists of a 
near complete record of all plenary speeches in the Ugandan Parliament from 1998 to 
2011.249 Notably though, the research Clayton et al. conducted falls short of capturing 
differences between MPs policy preferences and political ideologies such as feminist 
versus conservative. 
 
Through the analysis of the aforementioned dataset, Clayton et al. are trying to prove 
or disprove five hypotheses regarding women’s participation and representation in the 
Ugandan parliament. The first hypothesis claims that women speak more about women’s 
interests than men and that there are no differences in speech patterns between women 
in reserved and unreserved seats.250 Hypothesis two notes that men speak as much or 
more about women’s interests than women. The third hypothesis claims that women in 
reserved seats speak less about women’s interests than women in open seats. Hypothesis 
four in comparison to three, claims that women in reserved seats speak more about 
women’s interests than women in open seats. Finally, the fifth hypothesis states that 
women in reserved seats that are associated with the ruling party speak less on women’s 
interests than women in reserved seats in opposition parties.251 
 
The study suggests that ‘female parliamentarians as a group, regardless of how they 
achieve office, share similar biological experiences, face the same socially constructed 
expectation about appropriate gender roles, and continue to experience many forms of 
active discrimination. The results of the empirical analysis show that gender, but not 
specifically gender quotas, affect the extent to which legislators raise issues that 
disproportionally affect women in plenary debates. In summary, Clayton et al.’s findings 
demonstrate that female parliamentarians devote more legislative speech to women’s 
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issues than their fellow male colleagues, regardless of how they achieved office. The 
findings strongly support hypothesis one, which links descriptive effects of quotas to an 
increased level of advocacy around women’s issues. Consequently, hypothesis two, 
stating that men would speak as much or even more than women about women’s issues 
was rejected through their findings. Regarding hypotheses three and four, Clayton et al. 
have found that there is no significant difference in gendered speech patterns between 
women elected in reserved and open seats. When speaking about hypothesis five, which 
related to the potential negative effect of ruling party membership on gender-related 
speech, they only found limited support for it. Ultimately, Clayton et al. argue that their 
findings suggest that the Ugandan quota policy may actually strengthen women’s 
substantive representation, even in a semi-authoritarian political setting.252  
 
As noted previously, female parliamentarians, in collaboration with women’s rights 
organisations, succeeded in the adoption of laws and policies that aim to promote 
women’s rights and eradicate any violations of the latter. The content of parliamentary 
debates and policies can serve as an indicator for the impact of such quotas. Although 
Clayton et al. argue that women’s substantive representation is moreover an effect of 
gender, rather than quota, it is inevitable to draw a line between more women in 
parliament, quota regulations and women’s increased representation. 
 
3 . 4  F R A N C E  
After analysing two African countries which have implemented quota laws into their 
municipal law, the inclusion of France, being a European country might seem arbitrary. 
To begin with, France is the first country in the world to have introduced a compulsory 
50 per cent gender parity provision for decision-making bodies on both, the local and the 
national level. Included in the journey to electoral gender quotas was a change of a 
constitutional provision, allowing for such a parité law to be passed.253 These parity 
provisions are framed within the concept of ‘parité’/parity.  
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Vogel-Polsky argues that ‘parity does not mean 50-50’ and that it is moreover 
‘demanded in the name of equal status, and not in the name of representing a minority.’254 
According to her, parity is not the equivalent to quotas, stating that the philosophy 
underlying parity is different from the one underlying quotas. Parity is often described 
as ‘perfect parity’, whereas quotas constitute a threshold, and are as such considered to 
be discriminatory.255 In comparison, Murray argues, that the notion of parity as a gender 
quota remains in principle and effectively the same.256 
 
3 . 4 . 1  T H E  P O L I T I C A L - H I S T O R I C A L  B A C K G R O U N D  
In the beginning of the 1990s, women held only 6 per cent of the seats in the French 
National Assembly. Notably, this number is very low and negatively astonishing 
considering that France is one of the world’s oldest democracies. The word ‘parité’ was 
adopted during the 1990s by intellectuals, party activists, women’s associations and 
feminists in France.257 Dahlerup and Freidenvall correctly state that the demand for parité 
is ‘based on the realisation of the shortcomings of French Republicanism, which has long 
excluded women from politics.’258 In France, political rights to women were only granted 
in 1944 almost one century after the granting of ‘universal’ male suffrage in 1848. 
Dahlerup and Freidenvall argue that the under-representation of women in French 
politics is not only rooted in history, but in general politics.259 
 
In the late 1950s, the French government re-introduced the Two-Round single-
member district system for the election of the National Assembly. This system is quite 
unusual in Europe and has qualified as a reason that impedes women’s entry to the 
National Assembly. As Mariette Sineau points out: ‘This system indirectly discriminates 
against women since, by ‘personalising’ the election, it gives the political premium the 
‘notable’ (usually a man): in selecting their candidates, the parties tend to choose the 
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most well-knows personality, that is someone who already holds local mandate in the 
district.’260 Nevertheless, through the introduction of the parity law, France stands as an 
exception, compared to its neighbouring countries, such as Germany, by resorting to 
legislative directives instead of relying on the ‘wisdom’ of the political parties and their 
voluntary party quotas.261 
 
3 . 4 . 2  S T A T U S  Q U O :  Q U O T A  L A W S  A N D  W O M E N ’ S  P A R T I C I P A T I O N  
France has legislated gender quotas for the single/lower house, the upper house and 
for the sub-national level.262 Currently, 228 (40 per cent) of the 577 National Assembly 
seats (the lower house) are held by women. 
 
According Sineau, the French constitution states that ‘the law shall promote equal 
access of women and men to electoral mandates and elected offices, as well as 
professional and social responsibilities.’263 Further, the French Constitution recognises 
the responsibility of political parties in upholding and promoting this principle.264 The 
French electoral law further provides that the members of the National Assembly are 
elected in 577 single-member constituencies, according to a two-round majoritarian 
system. The difference between the number of candidates of each sex that a party or 
group of parties present for single-member constituency elections cannot be greater than 
2 per cent.265  
 
In case of non-compliance with the 50 per cent parity rule, a legal sanction is 
imposed in the form of a financial penalty calculated in the following way: the public 
funding provided to parties based on the number of votes they receive in the first round 
of elections will be decreased ‘by percentage equivalent to three quarters of the difference 
between the total number of candidates of each sex, out of the total number of 
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candidates.’266 For instance, if (only) 40 per cent women candidates are presented, the 
difference between the number of female and male candidates presented is 20 point. 
According to this, the financial fine will amount to a 15 per cent cut of the public party 
funding.267 
 
3 . 4 . 3  S U B S T A N T I V E  G E N D E R  E Q U A L I T Y  T H R O U G H  
R E P R E S E N T A T I O N ?  A  F R E N C H  C A S E - S T U D Y  
To measure or to analyse indicators for or against quotas as a tool to increase 
women’s (substantive) representation is more challenging in the French context. This is 
in partly because of the French quota regulation’s design which is different to those in 
Uganda and Rwanda. The French Parité-Law is not as effective as those in other 
countries with a reserved seat system. French parties are given a way to buy themselves 
out of the quota, by paying a fine which most of the big influential parties are able to 
afford. As argued by Sineau, the law ‘brought a quick feminisation of the candidacies for 
the National Assembly, but a slower feminisation of the members elected.’268 
 
One of the arguments against the use and implementation of quota regulations for 
decision-making bodies is that quotas may produce or ‘seen be seen to produce second 
class politicians.’269 This argument is fed by the assumption that if women can’t make it 
on their own merit without affirmative actions, they shouldn’t be in politics at all. In 
contrast to this it is argued that women’s exclusion from politics is not an indication for 
their lack of ability but moreover the result of longstanding institutional, structural, and 
psychological barriers. Murray argues that as a result, the question of competence is 
essential to debates of quotas. 
 
Regarding the above, Murray conducted an empirical analysis regarding French 
male and female parliamentarians before and after the 2007 election and compared them 
to see, firstly, whether they have different backgrounds, and secondly, whether there is 
any difference in their parliamentary activity. Her findings suggest that newly elected 
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women do have slightly different backgrounds from those of newly elected men. Two 
conclusions can be drawn from Murray’s study. First, an increase in the number of 
women led to the French parliament becoming more descriptively representative, both in 
terms of sex and in terms of age and profession, though leaving out any tendencies 
regarding their race and or ethnicity. Second, the study found no evidence of ‘quota 
women’ being less effective in their role as parliamentarians than those elected without 
a quota. The latter is based on the participation in parliamentary life and does not support 
the widely held view that descriptive representation occurs at the expense of competence 
and meritocracy.270 
 
3 . 5  C O N C L U S I O N  
Studies examining the origins and impacts of gender quotas now constitute one of 
the fastest-growing subfields within gender and politics research. Where a first wave of 
quota research examined the spread and reasons for the adoption of quotas as well as the 
numerical impacts of these on women’s descriptive representation271, an emerging 
scholarship now additionally investigates the effect of quotas on the advocacy of 
women’s interests in politics and policy making.272 
 
According to Pitkin’s seminal work, The Concept of Representation, descriptive 
representation refers to the basic attribution of the elected legislators and how well they 
mirror the social group from which they are drawn. Substantive representation, on the 
other hand, occurs when legislators seek and are able to promote the interests and 
priorities of their constituents.273 Even though, in most cases, quotas increase the 
numbers of women in office, the available evidence suggests that their impact on 
women’s substantive representation has been mixed. Countries across sub-Saharan 
Africa, such as Rwanda and Uganda, have been particularly successful in increasing 
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women’s descriptive representation through the use of quotas. Yet, the reforms’ impact 
on women’s substantive representation is more varied.274  
 
In order to assess the impact of gender quotas in Rwanda, the representation of 
women in Rwanda’s Parliament has to be seen in the larger context of two trends: the use 
of quotas in Africa and the post-conflict and genocide situation. The post-genocide period 
has brought enormous change for Rwanda and especially Rwandan women. Despite the 
challenges women are still facing with regards to education, legal rights, health, and 
access to resources, Rwandan women did start achieving impressive developments. 
These include the new gender-sensitive Rwandan Constitution of 2003 and parliamentary 
elections that led to a Parliament where 64 per cent of the seats were earned by women. 
Nevertheless, it is important to emphasise that the majoritarian women parliament has 
been achieved in a country which was labelled as undemocratic, where a single political 
party dominates the political landscape.275  
 
Uganda has adopted gender quotas for their highest legislatives decision-making 
bodies during times of a no-party system where the political landscape was shaped by 
the NRM, the Movement’s no-party. ‘Previous studies examining quotas and women’s 
substantive representation in Uganda paint a mixed picture’276, as Clayton et al. argue. 
An early lack of success in securing women’s rights legislation after the 
1995 Constitution, despite the relatively high number of female MPs, has been explained 
by an excessively strong executive and patronage-based politics as well as the quota 
system’s disposition to create a group of women more beholden to the NRM regime than 
to the interests of Ugandan women.277 
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In comparison to Uganda and Rwanda, the French parité law’s impacts on women’s 
representation and presence in national legislative decision-making bodies is more 
difficult to assess. The French system has been criticised for being ineffective and was 
declared a political scam, which only superficially complies with the demands of 
women’s rights activists and feminists to increase women’s political participation. 
 
The case-studies reflect the impact of electoral gender quotas on the abovementioned 
kinds of presentation. The Rwandan and Ugandan case studies show an impact on the 
descriptive, representative, and symbolic representation of women. The laws and policies 
that were adopted in Uganda and Rwanda after the introduction of reserved seats can be 
said to be in the interest of women since they recognise women as a social category and 
further recognise the ongoing power imbalance between men and women. 
 
Because of the questionable efficiency of the French parité regulation it remains 
difficult to assess whether these regulations have a substantive impact on women’s 
representation and women’s lives. However, as assessed by Murray, due to the French 
parité regulation, one can assume that an increase in women’s descriptive representation 
does not result in a politician of ‘second grade’.
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C H A P T E R  F O U R      C O N C L U S I O N   
Gender quotas for legislative decision-making bodies have been adopted into 
national law in more than 110 countries as an instrument to increase women’s political 
participation and representation. Through the introduction of such affirmative actions, 
the debate around their effect and their potential impact on women’s life has emerged. 
This dissertation’s aim has been to analyse the impact of gender quotas in relation to 
women’s representation and substantive gender equality. 
 
The ultimate goal of gender quotas is the achievement of substantive gender equality 
through representation of women by women in decision-making bodies. Quotas aim to 
achieve this is through reforming the inherent institutional masculinity which 
characterises most legislatures and through overcoming the obstacles to women’s 
participation. These obstacles range from political, socio-economic, ideological, to 
socio-cultural ones. In order to accomplish this, gender quotas increase the descriptive 
representation of women.  
 
One of the aims of this dissertation was to highlight the connection between an 
increase in descriptive representation and women’s substantive representation. I argue 
that the very presence of a woman in a legislature is important for changing its culture, 
priorities, and the range of concerns.278 In order to measure any advancements in 
women’s substantive representation in the three case-studies, I first had to identify 
women’s interest. The identification of women’s interest is highly controversial, as it has 
a long history of debate in the feminist scholarship and advocacy.279 Furthermore, I 
distinguished between outcome-orientated and process-orientates substantive 
representation, not giving one or the other more weight in terms of benefit for women. 
 
The evidence from the case studies suggests that gender quotas itself will not 
immediately and directly transform into a meaningful change for women, with ‘change’ 
referring to actual outcomes in terms of policies and laws.280 However, it can be argued 
that gender quotas help to induce institutional changes in the long-term, since change in 
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societal attitudes and systems are achieved in a long-term process. Consequently, it is 
important to acknowledge the limited potential of gender quotas while taking into 
account the possibility of the positive change they induce, as seen in the case-studies of 
Rwanda and Uganda.281 One must take into account the political situation in Rwanda and 
Uganda. According to Chen, countries belonging to the fast track of gender equality in 
politics mostly came out of civil war or wars of liberation during the 1980s and early 
1990s, which, as she suggests, ‘might have resulted in enhanced eagerness for achieving 
political rights and guaranteeing constitutional civil rights.’282 Regarding the impact of 
gender quotas on women-friendly policies and politics, Chen also suggests in her studies 
that countries which introduce gender quotas, ‘tend to spend 3.38 percentage points more 
on social welfare than those countries without gender quotas.’283 She also argues that 
gender quotas are only relevant to social service and welfare among policy outcomes.284 
 
One can further assume that quota regulations have increased the symbolic 
representation of women and thus the discourse regarding women in decision-making 
bodies and the societal potential that this bears. The increase of women’s symbolic 
representation can be seen as an aim in itself. Hopp argues, that one must not 
underestimate the significance of symbolic representation. Fulfilling symbolic 
representation also means fulfilling women’s right to be represented by female bodies in 
parliament as they relate much better to cases such as maternity leave and exposure to 
sexual harassment by men.285 Symbolic representation of female bodies is essential 
because it leads to a process of questioning as to why a specific type of body, the male, 
is highly dominant in a political institution. This then allows for the de-normalisation 
(not de-valuing), of male bodies and therefore starts a process of normalisation of female 
bodies in parliament.286 Miguel persuasively argues that ‘numbers do make a 
difference’.287 The increase in the number of women make it more difficult to isolate 
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them in specific thematic niches or to place them in a bloc separate from major positions 
in the field.288  
 
Notwithstanding the importance of symbolic representation, the lack of emphasis of 
distinct female experiences and interests when advocating for gender quotas occupies a 
danger of essentialism, as critically examined by Hopp.289 Essentialism takes effect when 
gender quotas generate an over-emphasis on sex, on ‘femaleness’, thereby decreasing the 
significance of other aspects which influence a person’s identity such as race, class, and 
sexuality.290 This is the notion of intersectionality – ‘the complex, cumulative way in 
which the effects of multiple forms of discrimination, such as racism, sexism, and 
classism, combine, overlap, or intersect especially in the experiences of marginalised 
individuals or groups.’291 Specifically the notion that ‘any woman can represent all 
women’ displays essentialism.292 It is therefore important to take women’s 
intersectionality into account when analysing their representation. ‘Although it is 
evidently necessary to take into account essentialism as a possible drawback of the 
implementation of quotas, it is [still] equally important to recognise the shared female 
identity of all women’, as stated by Hopp. 293  
 
Despite studies stating the positive impact of gender quotas for decision-making 
bodies, they are widely criticised and still remain highly controversial. The criticism not 
only derives from conservatives or traditionalists, disagreements regarding the use and 
impact of gender quotas can also be found among feminists. One reason for this is the 
fear that women elected because of gender quotas could be stigmatised as ‘quota or token 
women’. In response to this, Bachhi argues that affirmative action, such as gender quotas, 
can be seen as ‘an attempt to redress entrenched privilege’.294 I share this perspective 
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because it represents a shift away from a discourse about women themselves, which bears 
the danger of essentialism, to a debate about exclusions, inequalities, and deeply rooted 
patriarchal structures in political institutions. 
 
As outlined in chapter two, international organisations, such as the UN, the AU and 
the EU, increasingly support affirmative-action policies, despite the term ‘quota’ 
regularly being envisioned. CEDAW, being the first international Convention to state 
that equality before law is not enough, strongly encourages so-called ‘Temporary 
Affirmative Actions’ in order to achieve de facto equality of women. The 1995 Beijing 
Platform for Action, though not mentioning the word ‘quotas’ speaks of ‘discriminatory 
attitudes and practices’ and ‘unequal power relations’ and the need for redress. 295 
 
Ultimately, one has to ask, why do we seek specific outcomes when it comes to 
women in decision-making bodies? Are considerations of justice not enough to support 
the increased representation of women in legislative decision-making bodies? 
Ultimately, women do not have to make a difference to merit inclusion. It can be argued 
that both the arguments, to increase women’s representation and the contexts in which 
they are made, seem to promise not only change, but also transformation. Although 
substantive and descriptive representation are analytically distinct, there is a tendency to 
expect substantive representation to follow from descriptive representation.296 
 
Even though gender quotas might increase women’s representation they are not a 
cure for all barriers that women face in politics, such as the lack of campaign financing, 
harassment, and the difficulties of combining political life, work and family obligations, 
among others.297 Quotas are still a start, especially in post-conflict countries and a 
promising instrument to increase women’s representation, having the potential impact on 
women’s life when looked at from a long-term perspective. Future research should focus 
on this through examining plenary debates, societal perspectives, and other indicators for 
change in women’s substantive representation which will eventually transform into a 
more substantive gender equal society. 
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In conclusion, more women in parliament, and therefore a larger critical mass, might 
constitute a necessary but not sufficient condition to qualify gender quotas as an 
instrument for substantive representation of women. 
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